The aim of this paper is to consider some grammatical criteria that Wittgenstein considers for understanding the psychological concepts of emotion and state of consciousness. The analysis shows that Wittgenstein uses criteria and patterns to distinguish emotions and states of consciousness in language games and their relation to life forms. Psychological concepts have a grammar depending on the actions and life of human beings and it is necessary to follow to avoid misunderstandings. By making a reflection on psychological concepts it is shown that the expression of emotions is linked to external criteria that Wittgenstein enunciates in a way that helps to clarify difficulties and with them he shows that what is in the mind is relevant if it can to talk about emotions if it can be put into a language. Throughout the text there is an emphasis on the concept of dispositional emotion and detailed implications that it has on the language games where emotions are expressed. It is also shown succinctly that, in the language games related to emotions, there are criteria related to the uses and actions that prevent emotional language from being affected by skepticism

Keywords: emotion, state of consciousness, sensation, dispositional emotion, emotional attitude, feeling

In the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein, reflection on the philosophy of psychology has a very important place, proof of this is the large number of texts and annotations that have been published on the subject. The aim of the present work is not to make an analysis of the psychological concepts in Wittgenstein; that might be too pretentious a project, and the goal I propose is much more modest. Basically what I want to do is to analyze the grammar that Wittgenstein proposes to clarify the concept of emotion. To do so, I will follow this order:

1. To show some characteristics of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, and to make some considerations of his style and methodical procedure;
2. To specify the distinction between mental states and dispositions always from Wittgenstein's perspective, trying to follow the analysis directly from his texts and taking into account the categories that the philosopher emphasizes in his process of showing philosophy as an activity;
3. To describe some criteria that differentiate emotions from sensations emphasizing the different contexts where the expression emotion is used, taking into account the Wittgensteinian conception of language play and way of life;
4. To take into account the recommendations and grammatical criteria when dealing with possible misunderstandings and confusions, in order to clarify the relationship between emotions and feelings; and
5. To present some arguments to defend that in the language games of emotions there are sufficient criteria to affirm that any skeptical position or challenge is untenable, that is, to show that in no language game of emotions is doubt used in the sense that it wants to be imposed by the Pyrrhonian or Cartesian skeptic.

Wittgenstein's method and style

A methodological and descriptive recourse of Wittgenstein's style is to permanently formulate questions, though not of the essentialist type that puts the interrogative pronoun what before concepts: What is a sensation? What is an emotion? Questions that, unless they have a context, lead to dead ends. If you ask me what you are doing at the moment, I calmly answer, I am in a lecture on Wittgenstein. If a question is well formulated, it has a context and has an answer, and if it is badly formulated, answers should not be ventured and the interlocutor should be corrected immediately; this means that the question follows rules that are linked to a context. Most probably, I will be corrected by you in my use of lexicon or in the wording of this text. Why is this correction happening? Simple, I did not use certain rules related to writing and editing, the same happens with questions such as: What is the essence of the foundations? What is knowledge? How to eliminate doubt? What is the essence of the first principles? These questions are not well formulated and rather than answering them, the person who uses them should be corrected; one way to do this is to ask him/her about the use and meaning: How is this expression used? What does he/she mean by this expression? The purpose of this strategy is to show the diversity of meanings and uses that some expressions have according to the context in which they are used.

To guide this paper I will present questions such as: what misunderstandings is Wittgenstein trying to clarify with his reflection on emotions, who is Wittgenstein trying to answer, how does the reflection on emotions relate to concepts such as language game, way of life, following a rule and others in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, what is novel in Wittgenstein's reflection on emotions, do emotions constitute some form of knowledge, do they constitute some form of knowledge, and what is the nature of Wittgenstein's reflection on emotions? This does not imply that I must answer these questions; I will refer to them as far as possible throughout this paper.

States of mind and dispositions

Philosophy for Wittgenstein must be a clarifying and therapeutic activity¹ and so enunciated in some of the first 133 paragraphs of the Philosophical Investigations (2017) and further highlighted in the present text. This way of seeing and valuing philosophy is present in the three known versions of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The first and second versions, on which there is a clear consensus, are represented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus² and Philosophical Investigations,¹ respectively, and the third in On Certainty,³ which is in full debate and on which it is complicated to find a consensus. But it can be said that any of the three versions of Wittgenstein's philosophy is perfectly defensible and refutable. In this text I do not want to enter into any of these polemics of whether or not there is a third Wittgenstein, I am well served if I can present to you some aspects and approaches to the grammar of the concept of emotion.

In the grammar of psychological concepts proposed by Wittgenstein there is a clear characterization between states of consciousness and dispositions. Wittgenstein uses the expression states of consciousness to refer to seeing "a certain figure, hearing a sound, having a sensation of pain or taste. On the other hand, the use of the expression disposition refers to believing, understanding, knowing or knowing, intending, among others".⁴ At the same point, he uses a criterion of temporality to distinguish between states of consciousness and dispositions; thus, dispositions would have a more prolonged and persistent existence while states of consciousness would occur at a given moment and their duration would be shorter.

The disposition to maintain a belief is not modified if the state of consciousness changes. In normal conditions, a human being assumes the belief that he has two eyes and in these circumstances cannot wake up one day doubting whether he has two eyes, whereas states of consciousness can change easily; in one moment, a person can have a state of consciousness related to sadness and in the next instant change it to a state of consciousness related to joy. It should be kept in mind that we do not distinguish our changes of states of consciousness, they alternate with very small frequencies and limits, and, therefore, we do not identify when we stop being happy and start being sad. A contrary situation occurs with dispositions, since we can distinguish in them with greater precision when we stop accepting some belief because it conflicts with another belief; the same occurs with doubt, knowledge, or understanding. In very specific contexts we can distinguish situations of doubt and certainty, of knowledge and ignorance, of good comprehension and bad comprehension.

Emotions and sensations

By introducing a psychological category such as emotion or mental state, Wittgenstein begins to show different language games where this category is used and is extremely careful not to enter into the vicious circle of definitions, which rather than clarity bring confusion. In language games one does not define concepts, one learns to use the expression in a meaningful way. In Wittgenstein,⁵ the use of this methodological resource can be noted from the outset when he exposes the uses of the expression emotion and sensation.⁵ Wittgenstein's reflections on psychological concepts abound in examples, descriptions, specifications that have the purpose of showing how concepts function in language games.

If I were to use the questions what are emotions, what are sensations? It would be an impossible enterprise to find a definition of emotion or sensation that fits all language games and, in the event of achieving some sketch of a definition, that definition of emotion would have been taken out and decontextualized from the language games where it is meaningful. On the contrary, the Wittgensteinian procedure is to show differences, to highlight some characteristics of emotions such as having a duration, an intensity, a course, not being locatable, not saying anything about the world, which is what is observed in the language games of emotions.

It would seem that not saying anything about the world implies that emotions do not provide conceptual knowledge of reality. The question remains open: is there conceptual content in emotions, in what contexts is the use of emotions meaningful? In contrast, sensations are localized and say something new about the external world, sensations can be located in one part of the body while emotions are spread over the whole body. Both sensations and emotions are accompanied by a behavioral expression related to expressions, countenances and gestures and tones of voice, that is to say that both emotions and sensations have in some circumstances similar behavioral expressions. For example, we can cry out of pain or cry out of joy; it can be noted here that Wittgenstein does not attempt to define the concept of emotion, but alludes to contexts or language games in which the expression having emotions is used in relation to various human activities. Wittgenstein's reflection on emotions, like other psychological categories, places them in relation to some concepts of Wittgensteinian philosophy such as language games,¹ forms of life (§19), the image of the world and the criterion of following a rule (§ 54). Emotions and their content are in relation to an image of the world, and of relations to certain objects and their situation, and the way we relate to those objects during our life.

Human beings learn to express their emotions in different ways, the expression of this emotion is given in a context that constitutes the language games and in these games emotions are experienced in different ways. The language games of emotions are very diverse and change from one context to another. In this variety, emotions are distinguished from one another according to the contexts and forms of life to which they are linked, since it is not possible to have a typification of what characterizes each emotion that is functional in different language games. The effort to define an emotion is destined to failure, since it implies taking the expression emotion out of the contexts where it is linked to forms of life. The tendency to make definitions involves successively introducing one category into another, at some point meaninglessness appears when the defined and the definition become intertwined. Wittgenstein affirms that the content of an emotion is linked to images, what he means is that there is a context, a circumstance, a way of expressing emotions and this is acquired by human beings as they learn the language of emotions. The image that constitutes the content of emotions is related to a way of living, of thinking, of being, of acting, of relating, of making gestures. The figure of the world is the background of the language of emotions and the form is constituted by the different ways and mechanisms of relating to others in the different language games.

Emotions are linked to thoughts. The use we make of the expression think is related to the expression of emotions. When we express a thought to communicate, it implies that we react in one way or another. The uses that Wittgenstein attributes to the expression thinking are diverse, we can take any concept and follow it up and it is very easy to realize that what Wittgenstein does is to present a synoptic view of how it works, how that concept is used in different contexts and situations. The exercise of showing the relationship between thinking and emotions is part of this methodology. Emotions are expressed in thoughts, which means that when we think we show aspects of the state of consciousness in which we are. To put it another way, the action of expressing thoughts has an emotional component that is shown in some way when we communicate, a thought that does not have or is not accompanied by an emotional content would not be credible, or would leave questions about who expresses it. By accompanying the action of expressing thoughts, emotions give them a tonality that enriches them with new shades of meaning that reflect what we are, or want. If we were to express thoughts in a linear way, we would look like robots. Now, although the expression of thought as robots has uses in some contexts such as plays on the ability to lie, in other contexts this type of use is unacceptable.

Thought, apart from enunciating an image of the world, of saying how the world is or what we think of it, also shows how we feel, how we are, how we relate at a certain moment to others, what is important and meaningful to us. "Emotions color thoughts".⁴ In thoughts we express ideas, we enunciate a conceptual content about the world, at that very moment when expressing thoughts, we show our moods linked to how we feel, and we show attitudes and ways of connecting with our environment. With emotions we put a nuance of tenderness, delicacy, or emphasis to our thoughts, as we think and express thoughts there is variability of emotions, some increase, others decrease, some intensify, others disappear. We react to questions or queries, we blush, we get excited, we emphasize, we change the faction of the face showing pleasure, displeasure, in short, a conversation is accompanied by a wide variety of emotions.

Now, in the action of expressing emotions we can speak of a first and a second person. In Wittgenstein's grammar of psychological verbs, he makes a clear differentiation between the first and the third person. This shows that the experience of an emotion is not the same between the first and the third person of psychological verbs in the indicative. I recognize my emotions in a very different way from the way I recognize the emotions of others. Other people access my emotional state from the observation of my behavior, but I do not need to make that observation to access my emotions. I, in the first person, recognize my emotions immediately as they arise in relation to the way I have configured my relationship with that object, or subject, in that context; my vision of the world, my figure of the world determines how I express the emotions that are interrelated in the language games with the way human beings of that community live and communicate. The origin of my and your emotions is linked to a context, and in that context we immediately recognize an emotion without the need to make inferences. For example, if I have configured my relationships with snakes from fear, at the moment of seeing a snake the corresponding emotion of fear occurs simultaneously; in the case of the third person, she requires the observation of expressions and gestures linked to an emotion to recognize my emotional state at a certain moment.

The part of the human body where the multiple language games are related is the face. As Tomasini⁶ says, the face works as a mirror in the expression of emotions, the physiognomy shows and reflects multiple expressions that make it possible to recognize emotions. It should be clarified that there are contexts in which expressions linked to certain emotions can be faked. A person can adopt, simulate or assume a description linked to an emotion, but this does not mean that he is effectively having the emotion; an artist, when acting, is only assuming or imitating the expressions that allow externalizing emotions, he is pretending, but he is not really having an emotion. That is to say, you can use gestural language linked to emotions to make an audience believe that you have X or Y emotion, when really what you are doing is faking a certain emotional expression. The fact that I can fake my emotional states using premeditated expressions does not exclude that others really have that emotion. For example, in a movie screening, the actors are faking it most of the time, but the emotions they produce in the viewers are real; the wide variety of language games about emotions includes language games where emotional expressions can be faked.

In psychological verbs there is a disparity between the first and third person for ascribing emotions. In the third person emotions are ascribed on the basis of the observation of behavior and gestural expressions, a situation that is not necessary in the first person; but in the first and third person there are common features related to the experience of emotions. Wittgenstein affirms that emotions are vivencias, but not experiences; at this point it is necessary to be very precise, to my way of seeing things, it means that I live my emotion but I do not experience it. This means that the experience of emotion is something proper to my subjectivity and that emotions, although they are related to external events, I live them internally within myself and do not experience them. Experience is a contact with an external object through some kind of perception, a situation that does not happen with emotions. Someone may ask me what does that food taste like? I pass him the plate and tell him to taste, to experience, to put his tongue in contact with the food. I cannot do this exercise with my emotions. I cannot pass my body to someone so that they can come in contact with my emotions.

An emotion has an object that causes it, but it is not always an empirical object. Considering the object, one can distinguish directed emotions from undirected emotions. What Wittgenstein means is that there are emotions directed to a specific particular object-"something is feared"-for example, the fear of going down a dangerous street and being mugged by robbers. In the case of undirected emotions, it is emphasized that they are not oriented to anything - "one fears for something"-; for example, when someone surprisingly throws a snake on me, as soon as I recognize that the object thrown is a snake I will have the respective emotions, whether of fear, joy, or something else.

In the exercise of understanding the way Wittgenstein describes emotions it is necessary to go to the language games. In the various language games there are expressions that have multiple uses that must always be taken into account in the exercise of reading Wittgenstein's works. In this sense there is, so to speak, a very diverse grammar on emotions. One could specify that this grammar is something given, that it is a variety of images of the world that we use to express emotions. That grammar refers to images and objects, the objects of emotions are in language games and the way we interrelate with those objects determines the way we express our emotions. Wittgenstein⁵ differentiates emotional attitudes from dispositional emotions. "Love and hate can be called dispositional emotions." What Wittgenstein seems to clarify is the closeness between emotions and dispositional emotions? One criterion he highlights is that emotional attitudes or dispositional emotions can be tested while emotions cannot be tested. An emotional attitude or dispositional emotion is a source of multiple emotions, but it itself is not an emotion. "Love is tested, pain is not" Wittgenstein⁴ If we consider an example, it would make sense that someone who says "love us," in this case that expression should withstand some kind of evaluation, such as allowing our bodily closeness, accepting very close emotional language, or showing more tolerance for certain actions of ours. But this kind of evaluation is not possible in the face of emotions; if someone is in pain, angry, happy, he expresses it and we, according to the context, immediately understand that behavior and ascribe the corresponding emotion without any kind of evaluation.

Throughout this reflection we have been able to note the differentiation that Wittgenstein makes between emotion and sensation; in this same context the concept sentiment (feeling, sentiment) appears. There is a very close relationship between emotion and feeling. Love, for example, would not be an emotion but a dispositional emotion; on the other hand, is it correct to say that love is a feeling? What are the uses of the term "feeling" in Wittgenstein? How is the meaning of emotions constructed, is it something internal or external? In considering the criterion of the use of meaning one might think that there is a prevalence of the external, since attributing an internal significance to emotions would generate some difficulties in the social understanding of the language of emotions; this must be considered further, and if so it will be the subject of another text. In a reading of Zettel, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (I, II) and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (I, II) it can be noted that Wittgenstein when he speaks of love is not very convinced of relating it to emotions, feelings, sensations and others; he only shows contexts where these expressions are used. Here is why it is not correct to subscribe to Wittgenstein in any of the famous isms of psychology or philosophy. Wittgenstein⁴ does not accept that love is a feeling and systematically in Zettel, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, texts that constitute his fundamental reflections on the philosophy of psychology, there is a permanent showing of language games where we use the expression love and its relations where it is shown that it is not appropriate to reduce love to feeling. The expression dispositional emotion is very significant, because at first it attributes an additional use to emotions linked to dispositions. This relationship between love and dispositions deserves further reflection with a view to presenting other contexts where these meanings alternate better.

I do not agree with Tomasini,⁶ although Professor Tomasini has all the authority to speak about Wittgenstein, since he is supported by his research work on Wittgenstein's work; I think that at this point he commits a slightness and that is to resemble dispositional attitudes, emotional dispositions and feelings, by appealing to a translation error to correct the expression "love is not a feeling". All Wittgenstein's elucidations must be put in the contexts where they are used. Wittgenstein says: "To repeat don't think, but look!”. The invitation is to observe because everything is open before our eyes, nothing is hidden, everything is there as our life. Before drawing conclusions, in my view, lightly, one should give priority to certain Wittgensteinian criteria such as prioritizing description over explanation, seeing details over making generalizations, showing examples over making exceptions, and clarifying over hypothesizing. When talking about emotion before making conjectures, what must be done is to show how the language of emotions works. For that reason, I placed the reference to the concepts I have used from Wittgenstein's canonical English translation so that as far as possible a dialogue with Wittgenstein can be established. Regarding emotions, Wittgenstein, Zettel,⁴ the only thing that can be said from the text is that Wittgenstein categorizes love as an emotional attitude and a dispositional emotion, and denies that it is a feeling. Here one cannot apply that which says that two things equal to a third are equal to each other; that is: since love is emotional attitude and disposition, then emotional attitudes are equivalent to dispositional emotions.

Confusion and misunderstandings

In considering Wittgenstein's use of emotions, there would be no great difficulty in holding that our philosopher places emotions on the side of states of consciousness. This is shown in the multiple objects that are involved with the causes of emotions as in the case of the action of listening to a song. This differentiation between states of consciousness and dispositions is maintained in most of Zettel, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. However, Wittgenstein himself takes a turn and decides to broaden the use of the expression emotion and introduce the expression dispositional emotion and emotional attitude. This Wittgensteinian turn leaves open a series of questions that are worth elucidating in a research paper: How should the expression dispositional emotion be understood? In which language game do emotions cease to be part of states of consciousness and can be considered dispositions? What exceptions in the rules of usage make it more appropriate to refer to emotions as dispositions instead of states of consciousness? In which language games can emotional attitudes and dispositions be treated as equivalent or not? How can emotions be distinguished from feelings in the different language games on emotions? Here it is well worth saying that there is an exercise in practical clarification, in description, in giving examples, in looking at family resemblances, in analyzing details of the rules of use of emotions and other psychological concepts to which they relate. It is not a wise way, in the case of Wittgenstein, to resort to the resource of a bad translation to try to dilute a confusion that is not solved in that way. The way is to use Wittgenstein's conceptual richness to describe a panorama, a broader way of seeing related to emotions.

In the various language games there is, so to speak, a very diverse grammar of emotions. One could specify that this grammar is a given, that it is a variety of images of the world that we use to express emotions. The objects of emotions are in the language game and the way we interrelate with those objects determines the way we express our emotions. Wittgenstein differentiates emotional attitudes from dispositional emotions, "Love and hate can be called dispositional emotions" Wittgenstein.¹ I do not share Tomasini's⁶ idea of making one substitutable for the other, emotional attitudes with emotional dispositions. Whether the expression love is used as a disposition or as an emotional attitude is determined by language games.

What Wittgenstein seems to make clear is the closeness between emotions and dispositional emotions; for example, consider a way of life where love constitutes the central axis of everything. People marry for love, live for love, die for love, wage war for love, have sex for love, work for love, suffer for love, and have children for love. Now consider that each of these human practices is guided by special rules of usage, which would configure a multiplicity of language games. The person who marries for love has some criteria to distinguish whether the person who claims to love him or her uses the verb to love correctly according to the rules already stipulated. That person in his or her way of life has learned that love implies an ideal of a partner, courtesy, interest in the other, accompaniment, protection, using romantic language, showing fidelity and loyalty, sacrifice. Here, if the courting person does not use the expressions related to the love she has, what the courting person says can be taken as meaningless.

When referring to a form linked to the expression love, the person will assume this cultural structure of seeing love because it is the figure of the world that he/she has, it is how he/she has learned to live and act with the expression love. When these human practices come to the surface, the person will correspond to that person's conduct with attitudes (way of being, way of behaving). Consequently, he/she can show signs of joy, acceptance, simplicity, trust, happiness, smile, react in a positive way or in a way of rejection and denial; this determines that these attitudes allow a multiplicity of emotions to flow. The game of language and the ways of life related to love are subject to change. Today, it is unthinkable that in some societies people offer a dowry in order to get a partner. In another time and in other societies a dowry was a motive for a multiplicity of emotions; that practice has changed, but material wealth is an aid in the process of getting a partner. Now, if you look at the above language game under the concept of disposition (being able to, disposed to, motivated to, showing ability to, being able to) in this context, love-related dispositions jump out. Some become crazy, confront their parents, submit, give their body, promise fidelity, become possessive, become more motivated, are willing to get married, are able to leave a comfortable life; others become selfish, mean, violent, are willing to give up work, college. With this exercise I want to show that it is wrong to equate emotional attitudes with emotional dispositions; what is more consistent is to look at language games and ways of life to see how emotions can be appreciated as emotional attitudes and as emotional dispositions.

The criterion or rule of can be tested can be applied to emotional attitudes and dispositional emotions in multiple contexts. You can say to someone "show me that you love me". If you are reciprocated you will receive something, if you are not reciprocated you may receive the "proof of love" or an emphatic rejection. In the case of emotions, you cannot give a proof, but on the contrary, you show them. You do not give a proof that you are cheerful, you show yourself as someone cheerful; an emotional attitude or dispositional emotion is a source of multiple emotions, but it is not itself an emotion.

Wittgenstein uses love in multiple contexts; one possible reason is the semantics and grammar of that expression: "Love is tested, pain is not" Wittgenstein (2007, §504). I must say that I do not quite agree that love is tested, I see love as a label to refer to very diverse mental states. If we consider an example, it would make sense that someone who says "love us", in this case that expression should withstand some kind of evaluation, such as allowing our bodily closeness, accepting very close emotional language, showing tolerance to certain actions of ours, being willing to make certain actions and sacrifices. Note that what Wittgenstein calls proof is part of the language games in which we use the expression love. But this type of evaluation is not possible in the face of emotions; if someone is in pain, angry, happy, he expresses it and we, according to the context, immediately understand that behavior and ascribe the corresponding emotion. There are other expressions, such as "I know you love me", "you are the love of my life", "I found my true love", that constitute expressions of love that cannot be taken literally, since they would be an exabrupt, what is necessary is to look at their meaning in the context where they are used.

Throughout this reflection we have been able to note the differentiation that Wittgenstein makes between emotion and sensation. In the same context appears the concept of feeling (sentiment). There is a very close relationship between emotion and feeling. Love, for example, would not be an emotion but a dispositional emotion and/or emotional attitude, according to language games. On the other hand, it is correct to say that love is a feeling, as Professor Tomasini says, appealing to the resource of a mistranslation. It is better to emphasize, as Wittgenstein states, that love is not a feeling, and then to examine in his works the use of the expression and likewise to consider other descriptions and synoptic visions that give more clarification. Let us look at: what are the uses of the term "feeling" in Wittgenstein? How is the meaning of emotions constructed? Is it something internal or external? When considering the criterion of the use of meaning one might think that there is a prevalence of the external, since attributing an internal significance to emotions would generate some difficulties in the social understanding of the language of emotions. In this respect, what Wittgenstein wants to say and show is that the term feeling is restrictive and it is not correct to equate it without more to emotions, since in multiple language games emotions are not reduced to feelings. The same is true when I say that love is a feeling, I cannot reduce the uses of the expression love to feelings. You can follow the essentialist's game and ask what is love? And answer, it is a feeling. Clearly, I have gained nothing by doing so and have only decontextualized the word. Note, for example, the definition of mother and mother in a dictionary, then compare the relationship you have with your mothers, then you will understand that the definitions did not capture the meanings and experiences of the context and that I must necessarily go to the source, to the contexts where the words have life and function, to the dynamism of language and human life. In multiple language games the expression feeling is related to being immersed in, having the sensation of, awakening emotions for, assuming fears with, and so on. This does not mean that I should equate the uses of sensation, feeling and emotion. A few examples are enough to give nuances: I feel peace, I feel love, I feel cold, I feel your hands; the grammar of the verb “to feel” invites us to go to the language games and to the forms of life of serving to make clarifications and eliminate confusion.

Skepticism and emotions

In the history of philosophy, the skeptical challenge in one way or another has been present. In this text I will only refer to the Pyrrhonian and Cartesian skeptical challenge, since in general with the arguments that can be rejected to these two types of skepticism, any skeptical challenge can be clarified. It is necessary to clarify that Wittgenstein, since his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, put a limit to the skeptical challenge, since he makes it clear that it cannot be refuted because it is a nonsense that is reached by not following the rules of questioning and doubting. Then, in On Certainty, he makes a masterly exercise of clarification. He tells the Pyrrhonian skeptic that he should not ask for a criterion to distinguish the true from the false, because to speak of the false and the true he already has a criterion. In other words, to pose the Pyrrhonian's equipollence he is already using criteria. To the Cartesian skeptic he makes a forceful exercise of clarification, he says that to doubt it is necessary to presuppose certainty, that doubt only makes sense if there is a certain bed that supports it. The final point for the Cartesian skeptic is to affirm that it is impossible to eliminate doubt from the language games of knowledge, since it is an element of knowledge and without doubt there would be no knowledge. Professor Tomasini does not address the challenge of the skeptic in the face of emotions, but he says something important and puts it in these terms: "in general there are objective contextual elements that allow us to decide whether someone is really excited or just pretending, although there may be cases in which it is impossible to pronounce with certainty...".⁶

Wittgenstein's position on the problem of skepticism is constructed from On Certainty; it is worth clarifying that Wittgenstein did not directly respond either to the Cartesian skeptical challenge or to the challenge of the Pyrrhonian skeptic. The criterion demanded by the Pyrrhonists, who claim that there are no criteria for preferring one theory over another, and thus dissolving equipollence, although that seems like a problem, is not. There is no language game where the use of doubt has that connotation and is sustained in human practices and actions. In human life forms and practices, judgment is not suspended. In language games, and in the form of life associated with them, there are foundations,³ these foundations are the criteria and bases of all discourse. What is true and what is false have certain uses, certain frames of reference in the language games that regulate human practices and activities. The equipollence posed by the Pyrrhonian skeptic is not linked to specific human contexts; to put it another way, this doubt cannot be lived. Now, in speaking of language games, those foundations, those beliefs, those propositions, in themselves are neither true nor false, they are the bases by which practices operate nor other beliefs are evaluated. The Pyrrhonian skeptic needs minimal conditions to raise his whole arsenal of dialectical doubt, including the suspension of judgment.⁷ Wittgenstein rejects the condition of the Pyrrhonian skeptic who conditions knowledge to every belief being justified, arguing that there are beliefs that do not require justification, because they are the basis, the hold, of our belief systems.

The response of pedagogical clarification to the Cartesian skeptic consists in showing that his universal doubt is not possible, that he is out of date when considering the minimal rules of the language game of doubt. The most negative consequence that the Cartesian skeptic must face is to annihilate the possibility of knowledge; the Cartesian skeptic is faced with demanding the indubitability of the foundations at the cost of dispensing with knowledge and, therefore, this is a very high price to pay. Wittgenstein's position is more modest, he accepts doubt for the benefit of knowledge; better still, he accepts doubt as a criterion of knowledge. Thus, Descartes' foundationalist perspective, where he postulates indubitable principles to support knowledge, is in a very simple way undermined by Wittgenstein with some paragraphs of On Certainty.³ I should also make it clear that there is a new epistemological perspective called Hinge Epistemology,⁸ which is born in this work by Wittgenstein and is much more in line with the natural and contextual functioning of language. The simplest claim, apart from the fact that doubt must be tied to human contexts and practices, is that doubt needs a firm grasp that makes it possible. Doubt⁸ is posterior to certainty. The minimal exercise for someone who wants to learn to play a game is to know and follow the rules of the game. The example Wittgenstein uses to illustrate this is chess: to play chess I must know the rules and follow them, if you do not follow the rules you will not be able to play chess, and in case you want to be too clever, your opponent or the arbiter will make the corresponding clarification. Thus, the Cartesian skeptic does not know the rules of the game of doubt, he forgot them, or he simply wants to be too clever. A Cartesian skeptic cannot overlook the rule that states that doubt depends on other beliefs or propositions being exempt from doubt. In case the Cartesian skeptic tries to bypass this constitutive rule of the language game of doubt, one should not follow the universal doubt game but rather correct him immediately, and show the intrepid Cartesian skeptic what the language game of doubt is like in our everyday life and what happens when we try to violate the rules by which we play those games.

In reflecting on skepticism and psychological concepts, I do not intend to show how we evade the skeptical challenge in all psychological categories but, rather, to point out that skeptical challenges are denaturalized stances detached from human linguistic contexts and practices. By showing that doubt and generalized justifications have no place in language games in different contexts of human life, not all beliefs are doubted or justified. As emotions constitute language games, these criteria are also extensive to emotions. We must remember Wittgenstein's expression: "it is there as our life". Here what we want to show is that the foundations, the objective criteria by which I refer to emotions, are immersed in the language games, they are the criteria by which those games are possible and each user accesses those criteria and can learn to recognize the expressions, the behaviors, the states, the ways of being, the indicators, and the nuances linked to emotions. For example, one can go to a funeral and observe the degrees of grief by the expressions of the attendees. The degrees of grief have a scale, some nuances, so to speak, and you might find differences and whether the grief is real or just pretending. Wittgenstein makes it clear, the language games of emotions have other language games intertwined, and one of them is the language game of feigning emotions. So a skeptic might challenge us by saying "you have no indubitable criteria for distinguishing emotions", or "the criteria you claim to have are not fully justified". I can draw on arguments already cited to tell the skeptic that the doubt he raises is not meaningful, it is nonsense, since he changed the criteria and rules for doubting and justifying in relation to the language games of emotions. Besides, he adds, the fundamentals are already given, you must play with those criteria and those rules. You cannot play chess with rules of card games, or with rules that you just invented, Mr. Pyrrhonian or Cartesian skeptic, if we are going to play the game of language of emotions the first thing you must do is to follow the rule of those games, otherwise, you will not be able to play.⁹

The previous reflection leaves some important results that are necessary to highlight. Philosophy as a classificatory activity has a broad sense and can be used to clarify the uses of fundamental psychological concepts such as emotions and mental states. Wittgenstein's method is not reduced to the use of procedures to do science, but on the contrary is linked to a problem-solving activity to clarify the uses of expressions in various language games. The uses of psychological concepts such as emotions, sensations, mental states and dispositions have meanings because they have external referent uses such as behaviors, bodily expressions, rules of uses and criteria that give them meaning within the language games and make it possible for human beings to use them unequivocally in their daily lives.

The way human beings use the language of emotions is linked to a long process of training and learning. Emotions have an important function in human life and are part of a language that has become specialized and can change from one set of language to another, used to give meaning and credibility to our thoughts. A characteristic feature of human beings is to learn various mechanisms to express emotions. Emotions enrich and give emphasis and meaning to actions, thoughts, and communication between human beings. The deep grammar that accompanies the expression of emotions allows us to differentiate fundamental criteria that regulate the expression of emotions in the first and third person, as well as the various patterns and behaviors that make possible the learning and understanding of the language of emotions.¹⁰

Human beings express their emotions in a consistent way in their daily activities and linguistic practices, and when some confusion arises, it is because the criteria that regulate the linguistic practices related to emotions have been used incorrectly. In these situations, the procedure to follow is to avoid adding explanations and to propose a clarification exercise that dissolves the difficulty. This is a mechanism that serves to dissolve the difficulties posed by skepticism in relation to emotions, where it is shown that it proceeds as an attempt to impose a doubt by ignoring the basic grammar of the language games of emotions.

None.

The author has no conflicts of interest to declare.

My research project was sponsored by the University of Granada.

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