Terrorism has become a major threat to global security, prompting China to adopt a series of legal and policy measures in countering terrorism. However, misconceptions persist in the identification and punishment of terrorist organizations, which undoubtedly undermine the efficiency and legitimacy of counterterrorism efforts. This study examines the controversy surrounding whether overseas telecommunications fraud organizations should be classified as terrorist groups. It delves into misconceptions within China's counterterrorism legal framework and proposes corresponding corrective strategies. By analyzing the current counterterrorism legal framework and the definition of terrorist organizations, this study reveals existing issues such as inconsistent identification standards, imperfect application of criminal charges, and incoherent sentencing configurations. It proposes refining the criminal charge system, harmonizing sentencing configurations, and appropriately expanding the scope of application for the crime of aiding terrorist activities to address these misconceptions. Through logical argumentation and case analysis, this study concludes that overseas telecommunications fraud organizations should not be classified as terrorist groups, as their primary motivation is economic gain rather than the commission of terrorist acts. 

Keywords: terrorist organizations, telecommunications fraud, counterterrorism rule of law, legal system, corrective measures

Terrorism, as a major threat to global security, not only severely challenges international peace and stability but also profoundly impacts national security and social order across countries. As a key player in global counterterrorism, China has achieved significant results in combating terrorism in recent years through the implementation of a series of legal and policy measures. However, several misconceptions and challenges persist in the identification and punishment of terrorist organizations. These misconceptions not only affect the efficiency of counterterrorism efforts but may also negatively impact the legitimacy of counterterrorism actions. In recent years, overseas telecommunications fraud organizations have become increasingly rampant, with their criminal methods and harmful effects drawing widespread attention. Some scholars and experts propose that, given the violent nature and social harm of these organizations, they should be designated as terrorist groups to strengthen countermeasures. However, this proposal has also sparked extensive and intense debate, with the focus primarily on issues such as the ambiguity of legal definitions, the complexity of criminal motives, and the difficulties in international cooperation.

Through an in-depth analysis of this debate, this study aims to reveal misconceptions within China's counterterrorism legal framework, including inconsistent criteria for identifying terrorist organizations, imperfect application of criminal charges, incoherent sentencing configurations, and an overly narrow scope for applying the crime of aiding terrorist activities. To address these issues, this study proposes a series of corrective measures, such as refining the criminal offense system, coordinating penalty configurations, and expanding the scope of application for the crime of aiding terrorist activities. These recommendations aim to provide theoretical support for further improving China's counterterrorism legal framework. This research not only advances theoretical understanding but also holds profound practical significance. By analyzing the controversy surrounding the characterization of overseas telecommunications fraud organizations, it offers new insights into more effectively identifying and combating terrorist groups while providing concrete policy recommendations for refining counterterrorism legislation.

Controversy over the classification of overseas telecommunications fraud organizations

Background of the controversy

In recent years, overseas telecommunications fraud cases have proliferated, with certain overseas fraud syndicates drawing widespread public attention. For instance, in January 2025, Chinese actor Wang Xing fell victim to a telecommunications fraud organization while working abroad. Lured by false job offers, he was deceived into an overseas telecommunications fraud facility where he endured illegal detention and forced participation in fraud training. Ultimately, through the concerted efforts of the international community, Wang Xing was successfully rescued and expressed his fear of the fraud organization through media interviews. This incident sparked widespread societal discussion about overseas telecom fraud groups.

Prior to this, on February 7, 2024, the Publicity Department of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China released the "Supreme People's Court Releases Typical Cases of Cross-border Telecommunications Network Fraud and Related Crimes." According to the "Opinion" issued by the "Two Highs and One Ministry," cross-border telecom network fraud crimes remain persistently high, with criminal methods exhibiting new characteristics. These include tactics such as "luring with high salaries" and "violent control," as well as the increasing organization of criminal groups, the compounding of crime forms, and the industrialization and overseas expansion of black and gray supply chains. Typical cases reveal that these cross-border fraud organizations control victims through physical punishment, forced "team-building" activities, and drug use, severely threatening victims' lives and property and making escape nearly impossible. Given the extreme violence and social harm inflicted by these groups, some experts and scholars propose designating them as terrorist organizations to strengthen countermeasures. However, this proposal has sparked intense debate.

Arguments in favor of designating overseas telecom fraud groups as terrorist organizations

Supporters primarily cite three arguments: First, the severity of criminal acts. Overseas fraud syndicates not only engage in telecommunications fraud but are also implicated in multiple international felonies including illegal detention, kidnapping, human organ trafficking, rape (particularly gang rape), forced labor (enslavement), extortion, intentional injury, and intentional homicide. These actions far exceed ordinary criminal conduct, demonstrating exceptionally high levels of social harm. Second, they exhibit characteristics of terrorism. In terms of methods and impact, cross-border telecommunications fraud groups employ extreme violence to deliberately create an atmosphere of panic, posing a severe threat to social order and personal safety. Although their primary motive is financial gain, their violent tactics and large-scale criminal operations closely resemble those of terrorist organizations. According to the definition of "terrorism" in Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, the activities of these fraud syndicates encompass multiple elements including "violence," "intimidation," "creating social panic," "infringing upon personal and property rights," "intent to cause casualties or significant property damage," and "serious social harm." This provision also includes a general clause covering "other terrorist activities." Therefore, characterizing certain cross-border telecommunications fraud organizations that engage in extreme acts as terrorist entities has legal justification. Third, it facilitates international cooperation in combating crime. If telecommunications fraud is merely classified as financial fraud, enforcement efforts would be confined to public security departments and hindered by complex cross-border law enforcement issues, resulting in limited effectiveness. Targeting terrorism, however, requires international collaboration, with all nations bearing a responsibility to provide support, thereby streamlining national-level countermeasures.

Arguments against designating overseas telecommunications fraud organizations as terrorist entities

Opponents raise three primary arguments: First, the absence of political objectives. The core characteristic of terrorist organizations lies in their political motivations, whereas overseas telecommunications fraud groups primarily pursue economic gains without political demands. Therefore, classifying them as terrorist entities appears logically unsound. Second, political implications. Designating overseas telecom fraud organizations as terrorist groups could unnecessarily create new political adversaries for China. This would not only divert and deplete China's political resources but also potentially weaken its capacity to counter hostile international political forces while bolstering the ranks of adversaries. Third, legal basis. China's legal framework, particularly the implementation of the Anti-Telecom Network Fraud Law of the People's Republic of China, provides ample legal grounds for combating telecom network fraud crimes.¹ For instance, both the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China and the Anti-Telecom Network Fraud Law clearly stipulate provisions regarding the criminalization, sentencing, evidentiary standards, and recovery of illicit gains for telecom network fraud offenses. Through rigorous law enforcement and international cooperation, overseas telecom fraud crimes can be effectively combated within the existing legal framework without the need to label them as terrorist organizations.

Key points of controversy

Definitional issue: should telecommunications fraud organizations be classified as terrorist organizations?

Telecom fraud organizations should not be classified as terrorist organizations. Such classification risks overly broad characterizations of overseas telecom fraud groups, obscures their substantive differences from terrorism, and hinders cross-border law enforcement collaboration.

First, there is no international precedent for designating telecommunications fraud organizations as terrorist groups. The United Nations Security Council's regularly updated list of terrorist organizations does not include telecommunications fraud groups. Claims that the United States has designated certain regional telecommunications fraud criminal groups as international terrorist organizations lack official sources and conclusive evidence. In fact, neither the U.S. Department of State's official website nor its related press releases contain records of individuals or organizations involved in fraud being designated as terrorists or terrorist organizations.

Second, strategies targeting overseas telecommunications fraud organizations remain inadequate. The persistent growth and expansion of these groups abroad hinges critically on their underlying economic and technological support. Therefore, we must adopt robust measures such as "cutting off their internet access and funding" to sever their resource chains. Concurrently, we should strengthen prevention efforts and implement comprehensive strategies that address both symptoms and root causes, striving to achieve significant results in combating cross-border crime. This approach is clearly more targeted and effective in tackling cross-border crime than relying solely on post-incident punishment or simplistically labeling such groups as "terrorist organizations."²

Legal basis: does current legislation support designating telecom fraud organizations as terrorist groups?

To date, China has established a relatively comprehensive counter-terrorism legal framework encompassing the Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, National Security Law, Anti-Terrorism Law, Law on the Management of Activities of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations within China, and the Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China. However, based on the explicit definitions of "terrorism" and "terrorist activities" under China's current laws, overseas telecommunications fraud organizations do not meet the criteria for classification as "terrorist organizations." The distinctions between the two are as follows:

Differences in legal definition

According to Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, terrorism refers to the advocacy and conduct of using violence, destruction, intimidation, or other means to create social panic, endanger public safety, infringe upon personal or property rights, or coerce state organs or international organizations to achieve political, ideological, or other objectives. Terrorist activities under this Law refer to the following acts of a terrorist nature: (1) Organizing, planning, preparing, or carrying out activities that cause or intend to cause casualties, significant property damage, destruction of public facilities, social disorder, or other serious social harm; (2) Promoting terrorism, inciting terrorist activities, or illegally possessing items promoting terrorism, or forcibly requiring others to wear clothing or display symbols promoting terrorism in public places; (3) Organizing, leading, or participating in a terrorist organization; (4) Providing information, funds, materials, labor, technology, venues, or other support, assistance, or facilitation to terrorist organizations, terrorist personnel, terrorist activities, or terrorist training; (5) Other terrorist activities. A terrorist organization as defined in this Law refers to a criminal organization formed by three or more persons for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities.

Article 2 of the Anti-Telecommunications Network Fraud Law of the People's Republic of China defines telecommunications network fraud as the act of defrauding public or private property for the purpose of illegal possession by utilizing telecommunications network technology through remote, non-contact means, such as fraudulent investment schemes, identity impersonation, or online traffic diversion.

Different objectives

Telecom fraud organizations primarily aim to illegally obtain economic benefits by deceiving victims into handing over their money.³ Terrorist organizations, however, are criminal groups formed to carry out terrorist activities. They typically pursue political, ideological, or religious objectives, using violence, destruction, intimidation, and other means to create social panic in order to achieve their political goals.⁴

Different behavioral patterns

Telecom fraud groups primarily operate through telephone and online channels. While they cause financial losses and psychological distress to victims, they generally do not directly employ violent tactics against their targets. According to the definition in the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, terrorist organizations typically resort to extreme measures such as violent attacks, bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations to create social panic, endanger public safety, and pose a severe threat to social order.

It is noteworthy that some overseas telecommunications fraud organizations may resort to violent threats, illegal detention, abuse, or even murder of victims during their operations. These acts bear certain similarities to the violent conduct of terrorist organizations. However, due to the fundamentally different nature of their objectives and other characteristics, the former does not meet the substantive criteria for a terrorist organization.

Effectiveness assessment: can designating telecom fraud groups as terrorist organizations effectively combat crime?

 Preventing and punishing telecommunications and internet fraud constitutes a systemic endeavor requiring multi-sectoral collaboration. Faced with overseas telecommunications fraud organizations characterized by rigorous organizational structures, extreme methods, and immense societal harm, we must adopt a comprehensive, dialectical, and long-term perspective to examine their developmental trends. Only through multi-dimensional measures—including refining the legal framework for telecom fraud prevention, implementing full-chain crackdown strategies, establishing robust defense mechanisms, strengthening industry oversight, and enhancing international cooperation—can we effectively prevent and combat these organizations' telecom network fraud activities. This integrated approach addresses both symptoms and root causes, comprehensively safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of citizens and organizations while maintaining social stability and national security.

For instance, financial institutions should be explicitly required to conduct rigorous background checks when opening customer accounts to effectively block infiltration by fraud syndicates. Simultaneously, mobile communication operators must assume responsibility for screening user text messages to accurately intercept potential fraudulent content. Failure to fulfill these duties should result in liable parties bearing responsibility for compensating victims' losses. Such measures to strengthen source prevention and comprehensive governance are more precise and effective in safeguarding user security than simply designating telecommunications fraud organizations as "terrorist organizations."⁵

China's counter-terrorism legal framework and definition of terrorist organizations

China's counter-terrorism legal framework

China has established a counterterrorism legal framework rooted in its Constitution. This system centers on the Anti-Terrorism Law enacted on December 27, 2015, supported by the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, reinforced by the National Security Law, and supplemented by other relevant legislation. Spanning multiple tiers—including administrative regulations, judicial interpretations, local regulations, departmental rules, and local government regulations—this system provides comprehensive legal support for counterterrorism efforts.⁶ Specifically, China's counter-terrorism legal framework primarily includes the following categories of legal documents:

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the state, provides the highest legal basis for counterterrorism efforts and underscores the importance of national security and social stability. The Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China serves as the core legislation for counterterrorism, defining key concepts such as terrorism, terrorist activities, and terrorist organizations, while establishing fundamental principles, organizational structures, preventive measures, and emergency response protocols for counterterrorism work. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China specifically defines terrorism-related offenses, such as organizing, leading, or participating in terrorist organizations; aiding terrorist activities; and advocating terrorism or extremism, thereby providing concrete legal grounds for combating terrorist crimes. The National Security Law of the People's Republic of China establishes the overarching framework for counter-terrorism efforts from a national security perspective, clarifying the responsibilities and authorities of national security agencies in counter-terrorism work. Other relevant laws, such as the Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China and the Law on the Management of Activities of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations within the Territory of the People's Republic of China, provide supplementary support for counter-terrorism efforts from different angles, particularly in areas like cyber counter-terrorism and cross-border counter-terrorism.

This multi-tiered, multidimensional legal system ensures the effective implementation of counter-terrorism efforts within a legal framework while also providing a legal foundation for international cooperation. Through the synergistic application of the Constitution, the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Criminal Law, the National Security Law, and other relevant statutes, China has established a comprehensive and systematic counter-terrorism legal framework, offering robust legal safeguards for combating terrorism.

Legal definition of terrorist organizations

According to Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, a terrorist organization refers to a criminal organization formed by three or more persons for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities. This legal definition establishes two core elements of a terrorist organization: First, the numerical requirement—a terrorist organization must consist of three or more persons, thereby excluding the possibility of individuals or two-person groups. Second, the purpose requirement: the establishment and existence of a terrorist organization must be for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities. This involves using violence, destruction, intimidation, or other means to create social panic, endanger public safety, and infringe upon personal or property rights, or coerce state organs or international organizations to achieve political, ideological, or other objectives.⁷

Additionally, the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China explicitly defines related criminal acts of terrorist organizations, primarily encompassing the following offenses: First, organizing, leading, or participating in a terrorist organization (Article 120 of the Criminal Law⁸). This offense applies to acts of organizing, leading, or joining a terrorist organization, with penalties ranging from fixed-term imprisonment of up to three years to life imprisonment. Depending on specific circumstances, it may be accompanied by confiscation of property or a fine. Second, the crime of aiding terrorist activities (Article 120-1 of the Criminal Law⁹) applies to acts of providing financial, material, or informational support for terrorist activities. Punishments range from fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years to fixed-term imprisonment of more than ten years, along with fines or confiscation of property. Third, the crime of advocating terrorism or extremism (Article 120-3 of the Criminal Law¹⁰) applies to acts of advocating terrorism or extremism through producing or disseminating materials promoting such ideologies, or through lecturing or publishing information. Punishments range from fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years to more than ten years, along with fines or confiscation of property.

These legal provisions provide clear legal grounds for identifying and combating terrorist organizations, while also establishing specific standards for conviction and sentencing in judicial practice. By defining terrorist organizations and related offenses, China's counter-terrorism legal framework not only ensures the legitimacy and effectiveness of counter-terrorism actions but also lays a solid legal foundation for international cooperation.

Analysis of typical cases

The following detailed analysis of three typical cases—Zhang Moumou's case of promoting terrorism and extremism, the Kunming Railway Station "3•01" violent terrorist attack, and the fraud case involving defendant Gao Mou—further illustrates the significant differences between terrorist organizations and telecommunications fraud groups in terms of criminal objectives, methods, and nature.

Zhang Moumou's case of promoting terrorism and extremism

Basic case details

In early 2016, Zhang Moumou downloaded violent terrorist videos and images via mobile internet access. Between February and October 2016, Zhang successively uploaded portions of these downloaded violent terrorist videos and images to his QQ Space for public viewing.

Judgment

After lawful proceedings, the court found defendant Zhang guilty of promoting terrorism and extremism, sentencing him to two years and three months in prison with a fine of RMB 5,000.¹¹

Legal reference

Article 28 of the National Security Law of the People's Republic of China: The state opposes all forms of terrorism and extremism and strengthens its capacity to prevent and respond to terrorism.

Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China: The state opposes all forms of extremism that incite hatred, discrimination, or violence by distorting religious doctrines or other means.

Article 120-3 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: Any person who produces or disseminates books, audio-visual materials, or other items promoting terrorism or extremism, or who promotes terrorism or extremism through lectures, information dissemination, or other means, or incites the commission of terrorist activities, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights, and shall also be fined. Where the circumstances are serious, the punishment shall be fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years, along with a fine or confiscation of property.

Application of criminal charges

The court determined that Zhang constituted the crime of advocating terrorism and extremism because he intentionally uploaded violent terrorist videos and images to the internet for others to view. This meets the objective conduct and subjective intent requirements of Article 120-3 of the Criminal Law, "advocating terrorism through the dissemination of information," and the content possesses extremist incitement.

Basis for sentencing

In sentencing, the court comprehensively considered the scope of dissemination, the absence of actual harmful consequences, and potential mitigating circumstances. The defendant was sentenced to two years and three months of fixed-term imprisonment with a fine, which falls within the statutory range (less than five years) and aligns with the counter-terrorism legislation's intent to severely punish online terrorism-related crimes. The application of law was accurate, and the punishment was commensurate with the crime.

Kunming railway station "3•01" terrorist attack case

Basic case details

On March 1, 2014, a group of terrorists attacked innocent civilians with knives at Kunming Railway Station, resulting in 31 deaths and 141 injuries, including 40 severe injuries.

Judgment

After lawful proceedings, the court sentenced Iskandar Aihaiti, Tuerhong Tohaniyazi, and Yushan Mamat to death for the crimes of organizing and leading a terrorist organization and intentional homicide, with sentences to run concurrently. Patiguli Tohiti was sentenced to life imprisonment for the crimes of participating in a terrorist organization and intentional homicide, with sentences to run concurrently.

Legal reference

Article 28 of the National Security Law of the People's Republic of China: The state opposes all forms of terrorism and extremism, strengthens its capacity for preventing and handling terrorism, and conducts intelligence gathering, investigation, prevention, response, and financial oversight in accordance with the law. It shall ban terrorist organizations and severely punish violent terrorist activities.

Article 79 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China: Criminal liability shall be pursued according to law for organizing, planning, preparing, or carrying out terrorist activities; advocating terrorism; inciting terrorist activities; illegally possessing items promoting terrorism; compelling others to wear clothing or display symbols promoting terrorism in public places; organizing, leading, or participating in terrorist organizations; or providing assistance to terrorist organizations, terrorist personnel, terrorist activities, or terrorist training.

Article 120 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: Those who organize or lead a terrorist organization shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years or life imprisonment, and shall also be subject to confiscation of property. Those who actively participate shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years and shall also be subject to a fine. Other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights, and may also be subject to a fine. Where the crime specified in the preceding paragraph is committed in conjunction with crimes such as murder, explosion, or kidnapping, punishment shall be imposed in accordance with the provisions on cumulative punishment for multiple crimes.

Application of criminal charges

The court determined that Iskandar Aihaiti and others committed the crimes of organizing and leading a terrorist organization and intentional homicide. Their actions met the elements of Article 120 of the Criminal Law, "Organizing and leading a terrorist organization and committing homicide." By planning and carrying out the violent attack at Kunming Railway Station, the perpetrators caused significant casualties. This constitutes a terrorist organization directly committing violent terrorist crimes, violating the prohibitive provisions of Article 79 of the Anti-Terrorism Law, "Organizing and Carrying out Terrorist Activities." Given the concurrent existence of terrorist activities and intentional homicide, the court lawfully imposed cumulative punishment for multiple offenses, sentencing the principal offenders to death. This reflects the legislative intent of Article 28 of the National Security Law, which mandates "severe punishment for violent terrorist activities," and demonstrates a judicial stance of "zero tolerance" toward terrorist crimes. The application of law was accurate, and the punishment was commensurate with the crime.

Basis for sentencing

In sentencing, Iskandar Aihaiti and others, as organizers and leaders who planned and directed the terrorist attack, demonstrated profound subjective malice. Their actions met the aggravating circumstances under Article 120 of the Criminal Law ("Organizing and Leading a Terrorist Organization") and Article 79 of the Anti-Terrorism Law ("Carrying Out Terrorist Activities"), warranting the maximum penalty of death. Although Patiguli Tohuti participated in the crime, her role was relatively minor. The court sentenced her to life imprisonment for the crime of "participating in a terrorist organization" combined with the crime of intentional homicide, reflecting the principle of differential sentencing for principal and accessory offenders under the Criminal Law.

Fraud case involving defendant Gao

Basic case details

In February 2021, defendant Gao Mou was lured by promises of "high salaries" and illegally crossed into Myanmar to join a telecommunications network fraud syndicate. The syndicate operated under a strict hierarchical structure divided into multiple teams, each with designated ranks including team leaders, directors, managers, group leaders, and agents. Specific fraud quotas were imposed, and agents who disobeyed management or failed to meet targets faced punishments such as fines, physical punishment, and beatings. After joining the group, Gao assumed a "high-end" persona using another person's identity as directed by superiors. He used karaoke-style entertainment apps to target women, luring victims into chats on social media platforms. Employing internal "scripts," he cultivated emotional connections with them. Once trust was established, he persuaded victims to make deposits and investments on the fraud group's controlled app platform under the guise of investments. He then deceived them into further deposits by claiming these were for taxes or security deposits. Investigations revealed that Gao defrauded over $170,000 during his time with the syndicate. Later, attempting to flee the criminal group, he was apprehended and beaten. He subsequently contacted his family in China to pay a substantial "ransom" to the syndicate before being allowed to return to China.¹²

On August 31, 2021, after receiving a call from public security authorities, defendant Gao voluntarily surrendered to the police and truthfully confessed to the aforementioned criminal acts. He also disclosed that the fraud ring controlled members through coercive "team-building" activities and drug use, while requiring that business commissions be spent exclusively within the telecom fraud complex and prohibiting their mailing back to China.

Judgment

The court determined that defendant Gao, with intent to illegally appropriate property, defrauded others of assets amounting to an exceptionally large sum, constituting the crime of fraud. As an accomplice in the joint crime, Gao demonstrated mitigating factors including voluntary surrender and acceptance of punishment. He was sentenced to four years and three months imprisonment for fraud, fined RMB 15,000, and ordered to forfeit criminal proceeds and compensate victims in accordance with the law.

Legal reference

Article 266 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: Whoever defrauds public or private property in a relatively large amount shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, or public surveillance, and shall also be fined or be subject to a single penalty of a fine. Where the amount is huge or there are other serious circumstances, the sentence shall be fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years, and a fine shall also be imposed. Where the amount is exceptionally huge or there are other particularly serious circumstances, the sentence shall be fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years or life imprisonment, and a fine shall also be imposed or the property shall be confiscated. Where this Law provides otherwise, such provisions shall apply.

Article 27 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: A person who plays a secondary or auxiliary role in a joint crime shall be an accessory. For an accessory, punishment shall be mitigated, reduced, or exempted.

Article 67 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: A person who voluntarily surrenders after committing a crime and truthfully confesses his or her crimes shall be deemed to have surrendered. For criminals who surrender, punishment may be mitigated or reduced. Where the crime is relatively minor, punishment may be exempted.

Article 64 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: All property unlawfully obtained by a criminal shall be confiscated or ordered to be returned; the lawful property of the victim shall be promptly returned; contraband and the criminal's own property used for the crime shall be confiscated. Confiscated property and fines shall be remitted to the state treasury and shall not be misappropriated or disposed of arbitrarily.

Application of criminal charges

The court determined that defendant Gao, acting within an overseas telecommunications fraud syndicate, induced victims to invest under false pretenses and defrauded over US$170,000. His actions meet the elements of the crime of fraud under Article 266 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, with the involved amount reaching the threshold of "particularly large sum."

Basis for sentencing

Considering that Gao acted as an agent under hierarchical direction within the syndicate and played a secondary role in the joint crime, he was legally recognized as an accessory (Article 27 of the Criminal Law). Taking into account his voluntary surrender, truthful confession of criminal facts (Article 67 of the Criminal Law), and attitude of admitting guilt and accepting punishment, the court lawfully reduced the benchmark sentence, sentencing him to four years and three months of fixed-term imprisonment with a fine. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 64 of the Criminal Law, illicit gains were confiscated and restitution made to the victims, achieving the dual objectives of punishing the crime and recovering losses. The sentencing was lawful and reasonable.

Three cases reveal significant differences between terrorist organizations and telecommunications fraud groups. In terms of criminal objectives, terrorist organizations focus on propagating extremist ideology and creating social panic. For instance, Zhang Moumou disseminated violent terrorist videos to incite ideological conflict, while the Kunming Railway Station terrorist attack directly carried out terror by slaughtering innocent civilians. In contrast, the Gao Mou case shows that telecommunications fraud groups primarily aim to illegally appropriate substantial assets, driven directly by economic gain. Regarding criminal methods, terrorist organizations employ both ideological infiltration and violent attacks. Zhang used online platforms to disseminate extremist content, while the Kunming perpetrators carried out mass killings with knives—methods that are overt and directly destructive. Telecommunications fraud groups, however, rely on hierarchical operations and technological disguises. For instance, Gao committed covert fraud by impersonating others and fabricating scripts, indirectly infringing on property through psychological manipulation. Regarding the nature of harm, terrorist activities severely threaten national security and social stability. Zhang's case was prosecuted under counterterrorism laws to severely punish ideological dissemination, while the principal perpetrator of the Kunming case received the death penalty for extreme violence, reflecting a judicial focus on curbing the spread of terrorism. Telecommunications fraud disrupts economic order and personal property. Gao's case was prosecuted under ordinary criminal laws, with the primary emphasis on recovering stolen funds, mitigating losses, and dismantling criminal networks.

Misconceptions and corrective measures in china's counter-terrorism legal framework

Existing misconceptions

Inconsistent criteria for designating terrorist organizations

Regarding definitional discrepancies, differing legal texts and judicial interpretations contain variations in the definition of terrorist organizations, leading to inconsistent recognition standards. For example, the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China and the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China exhibit inconsistencies in the details of their definitions of terrorist organizations, affecting the accurate identification of such groups in judicial practice.¹³

Regarding operational discrepancies, different regions and departments apply varying standards for identifying terrorist organizations in practice, undermining the consistency and effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Such inconsistencies may result in the same act being classified as terrorism in one region and as a common crime in another, thereby weakening the overall impact of counterterrorism work.

Inadequate application of terrorism-related criminal charges

Regarding legislative gaps, certain terrorist acts are only prosecuted under general criminal charges, creating legislative vacuums. For instance, when an individual who has left a terrorist organization commits violent crimes leveraging their former "influence," they can only be convicted and punished under general criminal provisions, which fails to adequately reflect the terrorist nature of their actions.

 Regarding deficiencies in the criminal charge system, mainland China's terrorism-related charges primarily fall into two categories: exclusive charges and related charges. Exclusive charges include organizing, leading, or participating in terrorist organizations; aiding terrorist activities; preparing to carry out terrorist activities; and advocating terrorism, extremism, or inciting terrorist activities. Related charges are scattered across various sections of the Criminal Law, such as explosion offenses, intentional homicide, and intentional injury. Dedicated offenses include organizing, leading, or participating in terrorist organizations and aiding terrorist activities, while related offenses comprise scattered provisions such as explosives offenses, intentional homicide, and intentional injury scattered across various chapters of the Criminal Law.¹⁴ This fragmented offense system often leads to ambiguity in identifying terrorist activity offenses during judicial practice, failing to fully reflect their inherent terrorist nature.¹⁵

Inconsistencies in penalty configuration

Regarding inconsistencies in the imposition of property penalties, while the Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China emphasizes the application of such penalties, specific provisions exhibit incoherence. For instance: Article 120 of the Criminal Law merely states that "a fine may be imposed concurrently," whereas other relevant articles uniformly require "a fine shall be imposed concurrently"; For offenses carrying the same maximum penalty of up to three years' imprisonment, Article 120 states "a fine may be imposed concurrently," while Articles 120-4 and 120-5 mandate "a fine shall be imposed concurrently," and Article 120-6 provides for "a fine shall be imposed concurrently or as the sole penalty." This inconsistency undermines the fairness and deterrent effect of sentencing.

Regarding omissions in fine provisions for certain offenses, the Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China improperly omitted fines for the crimes of releasing false hazardous substances and fabricating or intentionally disseminating false terrorist information. This results in inconsistent financial penalties for terrorism-related crimes, thereby undermining the comprehensiveness of the penal system.¹⁶

Regarding the limited scope of the crime of aiding terrorist activities, Article 120-1 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China primarily targets acts of providing financial or material support to terrorist activities or individuals engaged in such activities. However, the scope of this offense is relatively narrow and may not comprehensively cover all acts of assistance to terrorist activities, such as recruitment or transportation of personnel. This allows certain indirect acts of aiding terrorist activities to potentially evade effective punishment, thereby weakening the legal response to terrorist activities.

Improper association of terrorist organizations with specific nations, ethnic groups, or religions

Some individuals or organizations simplistically equate terrorism with specific nations, ethnicities, or religions, suggesting that certain nations, ethnicities, or religions are more prone to producing terrorist organizations.¹⁷ This leads to the deliberate expansion and excessive securitization of counterterrorism actions. Such an approach not only fails to aid counterterrorism efforts but may also exacerbate social divisions and incite hatred.¹⁸

The limitations of studying terrorist organizations exclusively through a nationalist lens

Influenced by Western international political traditions, researchers have over-relied on the "statist research paradigm," embedding terrorist organizations within nation-states. This approach posits that the roots of Islamic extremism or terrorism lie in the desire to overthrow secular regimes and establish religiously radical states, thereby overlooking the cultural origins of diffuse transnational terrorism.¹⁹ This singular perspective fails to comprehensively explain the complexity of terrorism.

Equating Islamic extremism with the Islamic civilizational sphere

Constrained by holistic research perspectives, people often conflate Islamic extremism with the Islamic world, overlooking the potential restraining effect of national identity in peripheral regions of the Islamic world on transnational terrorism. This approach not only fails to facilitate collaboration among secular regimes in peripheral areas with strong national identities to combat transnational terrorism but may also exacerbate the solidification of group identities, triggering the self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict narratives.

Formalistic tendencies in identification criteria

Some nations exhibit a tendency toward formalization in their counterterrorism legislation, failing to explicitly articulate criteria for identifying terrorist organizations and instead relying solely on whether they appear on prohibited or banned lists. While this approach simplifies judicial operations, it raises significant issues. The criteria for compiling such lists are often unclear, potentially enabling opaque manipulation by powerful actors. Moreover, it fails to adequately address or prevent the emergence of new criminal conspiracies—groups formed by multiple individuals for sustained terrorist activities—that are not yet listed.²⁰

Neglecting subjective elements of terrorist organizations

Some definitions fail to clarify the subjective elements of terrorist organizations, blurring the distinction between them and other criminal groups and potentially broadening the scope of enforcement. According to Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, a terrorist organization is defined as "a criminal organization formed by three or more persons for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities." The core characteristics of "terrorist activities" include objective acts such as "creating social panic, endangering public safety, infringing upon personal or property rights," or "coercing state organs or international organizations." Similar situations exist in other countries. Under Australia's Criminal Code Act 1995, any organization that directly or indirectly engages in, prepares, plans, assists, or facilitates terrorist acts is deemed a terrorist organization.²¹ Such definitions may lead to the erroneous classification of organizations that inadvertently assist terrorist acts as terrorist organizations.

Corrective measures

Refining the criminal offense framework

Refining the criminal offense framework first requires establishing new offenses. The current Criminal Law already includes offenses such as organizing, leading, or participating in terrorist organizations; aiding terrorist activities; and preparing to commit terrorist acts. These offenses aim to severely punish terrorist acts and safeguard national and societal security and stability. Building upon the existing Criminal Law, new offenses such as "committing terrorist activities" should be introduced to professionally address terrorist crimes. Additionally, crimes should be created for different domains of terrorist offenses, such as "Maritime Terrorist Activities," "Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities," and "Cyber Terrorist Activities," to ensure comprehensive countermeasures against all forms of terrorism. Secondly, the application of criminal charges must be clarified. Specific criteria for applying charges related to terrorist activities should be further defined to ensure judicial practice accurately and comprehensively reflects the nature and severity of terrorist acts, thereby preventing negative impacts on counterterrorism effectiveness due to improper application of charges.²²

Coordinating penal provisions

Coordinating criminal penalties requires attention to three aspects. First, unify provisions on property penalties. Harmonize inconsistent provisions regarding property penalties in the Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China to ensure consistency in their application across all relevant clauses, thereby strengthening the fairness and deterrent effect of penalties.²³ Second, supplement omitted fines. Add fines for the crimes of releasing false hazardous substances and fabricating or intentionally spreading false terrorist information to improve the system of property penalties for terrorism crimes, ensuring comprehensiveness and coordination in sentencing. Third, broaden the scope of the crime of aiding terrorist activities. Through legislation or judicial interpretations, expand the application of this crime to cover more acts of indirect support for terrorist activities, ensuring effective punishment for all forms of support and enhancing the law's deterrent effect.

Addressing limitations in research perspectives

The formation and development of terrorist organizations constitute a complex process influenced by multiple factors including political, economic, cultural, and religious elements. A multidisciplinary, multi-perspective research approach should be adopted to comprehensively consider all relevant factors, conducting in-depth analyses of the origins, organizational structures, and operational patterns of terrorist organizations to formulate more precise counterterrorism strategies. Simultaneously, research paradigms confined solely to a nationalist perspective should be discarded, avoiding the simplistic embedding of terrorist organizations within the framework of nation-states while overlooking their transnational nature and cultural roots.

Correcting misconceptions about terrorist organizations

Terrorism, as a common enemy of human society, transcends national borders, ethnicities, and religions. According to the 2023 Global Terrorism Index Report, the evolving dynamics and most severely affected nations reveal terrorism's pervasive nature and threat to global security. Terrorist organizations often exploit certain extremist ideologies or distorted religious doctrines to incite and recruit members. However, this does not imply that entire nations, ethnic groups, or religions are associated with terrorism. Counterterrorism efforts must precisely target terrorist organizations and their members, avoiding harm to innocent populations and preventing hatred and division stemming from misidentification. Only then can the fairness and effectiveness of counterterrorism be truly achieved. Furthermore, the Islamic world must be properly understood. The Islamic world constitutes a vast cultural system characterized by rich diversity, encompassing distinct ethnicities, nationalities, languages, religious affiliations, and historical-cultural backgrounds. The actions of individual terrorist organizations cannot be simplistically attributed to the entire Islamic world. It is essential to deeply recognize the internal pluralism of the Islamic world, proactively seek collaboration with governments, social organizations, and the broader public across nations, and work together to confront the threat of terrorism.

Correcting the formalistic tendency in designation criteria

The designation of terrorist organizations should comprehensively consider multiple factors, including the nature, objectives, activities, and membership composition of the organization, to establish scientific, reasonable, and clear criteria for designation. Simultaneously, a dynamic list-updating mechanism should be established to promptly incorporate newly emerging terrorist organizations into the list, ensuring the accuracy and effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. We must abandon the formalistic approach of relying solely on whether an organization appears on a prohibited or banned list, thereby avoiding misjudgments caused by ambiguous lists or opaque operations.²⁴

Emphasizing the subjective elements of terrorist organizations

When defining terrorist organizations, their subjective elements must be fully considered, clarifying that their establishment and continued existence serve the purpose of jointly committing terrorist crimes. Simultaneously, a clear distinction must be drawn between the objectives of terrorist crimes and the original intent behind the organization's formation, preventing the erroneous inclusion of the ultimate goals of terrorist crimes within the definition of a terrorist organization. By clarifying subjective elements, terrorist organizations can be accurately identified, avoiding collateral damage to innocents and ensuring the precision and legality of counterterrorism efforts. Through the above analysis, this paper reveals misconceptions in China's counterterrorism legal framework and proposes corresponding corrective measures. These measures not only contribute to refining China's counterterrorism legal system but also enhance the efficiency and legitimacy of counterterrorism efforts, ensuring precision and fairness in counterterrorism actions.

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²Zhao BZ. An International Perspective on Rule of Law Counterterrorism: Challenges and Countermeasures. Journal of Southeast University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition). 2020;2(2):84–89.

³Addison T, Murshed SM. Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries. Defence and Peace Economics. 2005;16(2):69–82.

⁴Gao Mingxuan. On the Judicial Response to Telecom Network Fraud in Mainland China. Journal of Police Science Research. 2019;2:12–14.

⁵Yao Zhishuai. Research on the Co-governance Model of the Black Industry Chain of Telecommunications Network Fraud. Journal of Henan University of Science and Technology. 2019;5:50.

⁶Wan Hong. On the Construction and Improvement of China's Counter-Terrorism Legal System. Journal of China People's Public Security University (Social Sciences Edition). 2019;4:67–74.

⁷According to Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, a terrorist organization refers to “a criminal organization formed by three or more persons for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities.” Specifically, terrorist activities refer to the following acts of a terrorist nature: organizing, planning, preparing, or carrying out activities that cause serious social harm such as casualties, major property damage, destruction of public facilities, or disruption of social order; advocating terrorism, inciting terrorist activities, or illegally possessing items promoting terrorism; compelling others to wear clothing or display symbols promoting terrorism in public places; providing information, funds, materials, labor, technology, venues, or other forms of support, assistance, or facilitation to terrorist organizations, terrorist personnel, terrorist activities, or terrorist training.

⁸Article 120 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that organizing or leading a terrorist organization shall be punished by fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years or life imprisonment, along with confiscation of property. Active participants shall be punished by fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years, along with a fine. Other participants shall be punished by fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights, and may also be fined. Those committing the crime specified in the preceding paragraph and also committing crimes such as murder, explosion, or kidnapping shall be punished in accordance with the provisions on cumulative punishment for multiple crimes.

⁹Article 120-1 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that those who finance terrorist organizations, individuals carrying out terrorist activities, or terrorist activity training shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights, and shall also be fined; where the circumstances are serious, the punishment shall be fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years, along with a fine or confiscation of property.Recruiting or transporting persons for terrorist organizations, terrorist activities, or terrorist training shall be punished in accordance with the preceding paragraph.Where an entity commits the crimes specified in the preceding two paragraphs, the entity shall be fined, and its directly responsible managers and other directly responsible personnel shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph.

¹⁰Article 120-3 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that any person who produces or disseminates books, audio-visual materials, or other items promoting terrorism or extremism, or who promotes terrorism or extremism through lectures, information dissemination, or other means, or incites the commission of terrorist activities, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance, or deprivation of political rights, and shall also be fined; where the circumstances are serious, the punishment shall be fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years, along with a fine or confiscation of property.

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¹²Supreme People's Court Information Office. Supreme People's Court Releases Typical Cases Involving Cross-Border Telecommunications Network Fraud and Related Crimes. China Courts Network: 2025.

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¹⁶Li Yichun. On the Legal Application of the Crime of Aiding Terrorist Activities: A Perspective on Countering the Financing of Terrorism. Academic Forum. 2016;5:80–81.

¹⁷Li Hong. Criminal Legislation on Terrorism and Extremism Crimes in Amendment IX to the Criminal Law: From the Perspective of Restricting the Scope of Abstract Danger Crimes. Journal of Soochow University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition). 2015;6:84.

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¹⁹Jiang Peng. The Correlation Between U-Shaped Identity in the Islamic World and Types of Terrorist Organizations. International Security Studies. 2018;1:130–155.

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Logical argumentation

Definitional differences 

According to Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, a terrorist organization refers to a criminal group formed by three or more individuals for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities. The core characteristic of terrorist activities is the use of violence, destruction, intimidation, and other means to create social panic, endanger public safety, and achieve political, ideological, or other objectives. In contrast, the core objective of overseas telecommunications fraud organizations is the pursuit of economic gain. While their actions may involve violence or unlawful detention, their motives and objectives are fundamentally distinct from terrorism. Therefore, telecommunications fraud organizations do not meet the legal definition of a terrorist organization.

Legal shortcomings 

The current legal framework does not explicitly classify telecommunications fraud organizations as terrorist groups. To designate such groups as terrorist organizations, explicit legislative definition is required, yet existing laws lack such clear categorization. Forcibly labeling telecommunications fraud organizations as terrorist groups without legal basis not only lacks legal support but may also lead to confusion in judicial practice.

Practical effect considerations 

While designating telecommunications fraud organizations as terrorist groups might temporarily intensify crackdowns, it could also create confusion in legal application. Terrorism crimes differ significantly from ordinary crimes in nature, methods, and objectives. Including telecommunications fraud groups in counterterrorism frameworks risks blurring the boundaries of counterterrorism efforts, undermining their efficiency and legitimacy. Furthermore, such characterization may invite misunderstanding from the international community, potentially damaging China's image in global counterterrorism cooperation.

Critical thinking

Preventing overgeneralization 

Characterizing telecommunications fraud organizations as terrorist group’s risks overbroad application of counterterrorism measures. The core of counterterrorism efforts is combating politically or ideologically motivated terrorist acts. Including ordinary crimes like telecommunications fraud under counterterrorism frameworks could fragment counterterrorism resources, potentially disrupt social order, and infringe upon citizens' fundamental rights. Overly broad counterterrorism measures not only fail to combat genuine terrorism but may also fuel social discontent and antagonism.

Targeted crime suppression 

Counterterrorism efforts should focus on precisely targeting terrorist crimes, avoiding the erroneous inclusion of non-terrorist criminal acts within the counterterrorism framework. While telecommunications fraud organizations pose severe social harm, the nature of their activities fundamentally differs from terrorism. Existing laws, such as the Criminal Law and the Anti-Telecommunications and Internet Fraud Law, are fully capable of effectively combating telecommunications fraud crimes. Concentrating counterterrorism resources on genuine terrorist threats is essential to ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness of counterterrorism measures.

Case study methodology

Through in-depth analysis of the cases involving Zhang Moumou's advocacy of terrorism and extremism, the Kunming Railway Station "3•01" violent terrorist attack, and the fraud case of defendant Gao Mou, we can clearly observe significant distinctions between terrorist organizations and organized crime groups in terms of criminal objectives, methods, and nature. The core of terrorist organizations lies in achieving political or ideological objectives through violent means, whereas telecommunications fraud organizations primarily pursue economic gains. Although their actions may involve violence or illegal detention, their fundamental motivations and objectives are fundamentally different from terrorism. Therefore, telecommunications fraud organizations should not be classified as terrorist organizations. Consequently, we can further clarify that the focus of counterterrorism efforts should be on combating terrorism with political or ideological motives, rather than broadly categorizing ordinary criminal acts as terrorism.

In summary, characterizing overseas telecommunications fraud organizations as terrorist groups is inappropriate. This conclusion is grounded in the rigor of legal definitions, supported by the coherence of logical argumentation, and validated by critical thinking and case study methodologies. Counterterrorism efforts should focus on precisely targeting terrorist crimes, avoiding the inclusion of non-terrorist criminal acts within the counterterrorism framework to ensure the legality, effectiveness, and fairness of counterterrorism measures.

None.

The author declares there is no conflict of interest.