

Terrorist movements in Afghanistan, attitudes towards the status of radical fundamentalist forces in Islamic post awakenings

Abstract

For years, Afghanistan's development and stability has been threatened by radical and radical groups. The perennial domination of these groups in Afghanistan destroyed almost all the country's infrastructure and created unimaginable catastrophes. However, the domination of extremist and fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan has been shocking, and the day Afghanistan and the international community has formed the post-Talabani system, Afghanistan remains more like a land that has no signs of new civilization. And the new system began its formation from zero. But what exactly are fundamentalists to think about, and what is the main feature of their thinking and beliefs, which have so devastated Afghanistan. This question may be of interest to many young people of Afghanistan today. Most importantly, recognizing the characteristics of these extreme attitudes can prevent their re-dominance over Afghanistan. In this article, the authors are seeking to investigate fundamentalist movements and terrorist groups in Afghanistan and their feedback on the security of the Islamic world.

Keywords: afghanistan, terrorism, salafi, islamism, fundamentalism, security, soviet forces

Introduction

The emergence of fundamentalism in Afghanistan is one of the major phenomena in the political history of Southwest Asia, the Middle East and the Muslim world. The internal and external factors, including the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Red Army, the financial, military support of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan from the mujahideen, and the inability of the PMOI leaders to form an inclusive government, led to the rise of fundamentalism in the country. During the war in Afghanistan, the most important terrorist group, al-Qaeda, was formed today as the mother of the Takfiri-terrorist groups. The Taliban is also another of these groups that was formed at that time by the Taliban. The ethnic-religious structure, the war in Afghanistan, which began with the launch of Salafism in the country, and the two Takfiri-terrorist groups of al-Qaeda and the Taliban are among the issues discussed in this chapter.

Ethnic-religious structure of Afghanistan

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is geographically located in South Asia, and has a common border in the south with Pakistan, in the west with Iran, in the north with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and in the east with China.¹ 80 percent of Afghanistan's people is Sunni, 19 percent Shiite, and the rest are Hindu, Sikh, and Christian. Due to the diversity of ethnicities and nationalities, Afghanistan is one of the few countries in the world in which there are different and sometimes heterogeneous nations and nations. Ethnic Afghanistan can be considered as an amalgam of nations from the countries of the eastern, western, southern and northern neighbors. Along with the four major populations influencing the political life of the community, such as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek, many minorities such as Amak, Qizilbash, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and others live in the country. The diversity and heterogeneity of the peoples, due to the lack of a unifying central factor "except for Islam, which also have conflicting interpretations", has caused the nation-building

process to face serious challenges in Afghanistan. After several years of independence (1919), there has not been a common national identity for all ethnic groups in this country. In such a natural society, the circulation of political power is surrounded by ethnicity and tribes, and the grounds for political participation of other ethnic groups are eliminated, and this is not only the case of ethnic groups, even among specific tribes, among different tribes Has caused serious tensions and has led to a divergence towards the central government.² Here's a brief introduction of four major and influential Afghans.

- A. Pashtun peoples: Pashtuns make up 40 to 50 percent of Afghanistan's population, mostly in the east and south of the country, and sometimes in the north and west. They speak Pashto and all follow the Sunni and the congregation. The Pashtuns, in terms of population, have a relative majority and are politically the sole proprietor of the political mandate in Afghanistan (the Taliban, which are now claiming the formation of an Islamic state, have generally come from within this nation)
- B. Millions: The Millennium, accounting for approximately 25% of the total population of Afghanistan, is mainly concentrated in the center of Afghanistan in the foothills of the mountains, the Middle East, Hindu Kush, other parts of the country and northern areas of the habitat have. The language of this Dari Persian language and the vast majority of them are the followers of the Shi'a parsley. Hazaras, the main symbol of Shi'a in Afghanistan, have been deprived of political and social rights throughout Afghanistan's political history, and have been subjected to extreme ethnic and religious discrimination and prejudice.
- C. Tajiks: Tajiks are considered the second ethnic group in Afghanistan in terms of social status. They are scattered in the northeastern parts of Badakhshan, Panjshir, Herat and other parts of the country in a relatively short third row, followed by Pashtun and Hazara. Tajiks are religiously Sunni.

D. Uzbeks: Uzbeks are Turkic peoples who live in the northern parts of Afghanistan and the northern border of the country with Uzbekistan and dispersed in the cities of Mazar, Maimana, Khanabad and Kondoz. Uzbeks are religiously followers of Sunni religion.³

Afghanistan war: a beginning for Salafism

The occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, by the Soviet Forces, defeats the balance of power in South Asia.⁴ For this reason, the West and the Islamic world formed a threat to the balance of power due to the advance of communism to the south, a coalitions coalition against the Soviet Union in the region and to support the Afghan mujahideen.⁵ Islamism in different countries assumed that the conflict in Afghanistan was the battle of communism and Islam. It is believed that Islamist Arabs are getting to Afghanistan. Many Islamic scholars have argued that if they were to turn Afghanistan out of the grip of Russian occupation, they would be able to duplicate their many years of dreams, namely, the establishment of the first Islamic state within the framework of the Islamic Shari'a and the foundation of Islamic caliphate, Make reality. Islamic jihadists went to Pakistan and joined the Afghan mujahideen in Afghanistan after passing the educational process. By the end of the day, the number of Arab mujahedans called "Arab-Afghans" reached more than 30 thousand people.⁶

During the war, many young people turned to Afghanistan to defend their religion and faith and stand up to the "enemy of the blessed" and support the Afghan mujahideen. Among the Muslims who went to Afghanistan were people from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Palestine, Sudan, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Libya, Morocco, Lebanon, Pakistan, India, Indonesia and Malaysia. The experience of the Afghan war made extremists both Afghan and non-Afghan fighters. Unconventional Afghans by joining the "Arab-Afghans", which were more closely aligned with the Salafist and Wahhabi views, as well as proximity to organized jihadist groups such as Jihad and the Islamic Jamaat of Egypt, the Algerian military Islamists, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan and Garek al-Asr Kashmir were radicalized. On the other hand, the war has had a dramatic effect on the erosion of the Arab-Afghan warriors, especially those such as Osama bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Abu al-Bashiri, Abu al-Fahd, Saif al-Adil, who later called "global jihad" against Afghanistan.⁷

In fact, this war actually affected the three ways of exacerbating or militarizing the course of Islamism and its turn from localism to globalism; first, jihadi Islamist jihadists in this war experienced and skills Worthy military. They had vast experience in guerrilla warfare and the use of firearms and explosives, which later used it in terrorist ways. Secondly, the Afghan War provided a good opportunity to meet radical forces. The war gave a great opportunity to young Mujahideen Arabs, Turks, Pakistanis, Indians and Muslims from Central Asia. These warriors from different countries were involved in the war. This familiarity and coherence provided the context for the network links between them after the war. The war in Afghanistan gave rise to jihadist movements, global perspectives and ideals. In other words, the transhumoral jihad was planted in Afghanistan during the 1980s.⁸ Third, the victory of the victory over Red Power and then the handshake of Najibullah in the years 1989 and 1992 caused the strength and motivation of the radical forces. They have since discovered that force and Islam together can break any power.⁹ In fact, the Afghan war had a profound effect on the erosion of the political Islamist movement, and this space provided a good basis for the rise of the al-Qaeda organization, which we will look at further.

Al-Qaeda terrorist organization

Al-Qaeda's core emerged during the Afghan war. As previously mentioned, after the occupation of Afghanistan, the United States and its allies, Muslims from all over the world, went to Pakistan to join the Mujahideen in the jihad against the Soviet Union. In 1982, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, together with Osama bin Laden, established an organization called "Kabul Al-Kummah Llmijahedin al-Arab" in Peshawar, Pakistan, which served the Afghan mujahedin service.¹⁰ In line with the political and cultural activities of the group, for the first time in April 1988, the name "al-Qaeda" or "Foundation" was used by Dr. Abdullah Azzam. Azzam's theory was to establish an organization to provide social services to Muslims and serve as a foundation for the Muslim awakening.¹¹

He believed that al-Qaeda was an organization supposed to direct the power of the Arab mujahidin to the lands where Muslims were oppressed and oppressed,¹² and the ideology of al-Qaeda on four pillars Anti-Westernism, Salafism, radicalism and anti-Semitism. In 1998, nine years after the founding of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, in collaboration with the thinker, theorist and the second member of the then organization, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Rafa Ahmed Taha, and several leaders of Pakistani Islamist Islamists groups and the Kashmiri World Front Islamic Jihad "against Jews and Americans. According to a statement issued by this front, killing Americans and their military-civilian counterparts is obligatory for any Muslim at any time and place.¹³

In the second half of 1998, US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam also blew up, killing 235 people. This operation was attributed to the law, which was, in fact, a declaration of official war against the United States. In November 2000, the American SS Cool shipwreck in Yemen was blown up and the attack was attributed to al-Qaeda, and finally, on September 11, 2001, suicide attacks took place at the New York and Washington-based business centers, and the United States officially accused al-Qaeda of interfering with al Qaeda. The operation took place.¹⁴ With the US invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the organization entered a secret operation in the Pakistani border and suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq against US troops. Altogether, al Qaeda's evolution can be divided into three stages: the first phase is from 1989 to 1996, and al-Qaeda means "pioneering." Leading the Freedom Movement and Islamic Independence Movement around the world. Al-Qaeda's goal at this stage was to conduct a war against the Soviet Union towards outside Afghanistan and to continue in other territories such as Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and so on. The second phase, which covers the period from 1996 to September 11, 2001, and al-Qaeda means the "base". Following the issuance of bin Laden's declaration of jihad, a base or core was created for Muslim fighters in Afghanistan to engage in an international jihad against the West led by the United States and to help oppressed Muslims across the country. The third phase will be from September 9th, and al-Qaeda will mean the "rule" from now on, after the destruction of al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan during the US invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is scattered throughout the world. And its ideology expanded globally.¹⁵ Al-Qaeda has become, in its evolutionary stage since September 9, a highly flexible global access organization. No terrorist organization has ever been in terms of complexity and fragility and universal access, such as al-Qaeda.¹⁶

Takfiri-Taliban terrorist group

In the last decade of the twentieth century, a group of religious

school teachers were set up in southwest Afghanistan and began their political activities. They were taught at religious schools in Pakistan, who had been trained to collect Zakat scholarships and receive assistance from abroad and inside Pakistan.¹⁷ This group was the prime example of the unification and cleansing of the country from the autocratic local rulers, the dismantling of arbitrary groups and the establishment of order and stability in Afghanistan, but after the victories of the first, the goal was to establish a system based on Sharia and Sunnah. The Taliban, which claimed to be in a state of injustice and chaos in Afghanistan, managed to capture more than 90 percent of Afghanistan's soil in 2001, and to establish an Islamic Emirate in Kabul. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from Kandahar was governed by Mullah Omar, the emir of Emirate. The Taliban, which claimed to have established the state on the basis of the law, established and enforced strict laws.¹⁷ After the capture of Kandahar in 1994, they sought in the first action a set of behaviors. Do not let the women appear on the streets without the help of their husbands, including those who do not shave their beards. By claiming that Islam has prohibited the painting of life and art, the photographer closed the houses and theaters. They turned the city of Kandahar into the mosque and the Kandahar Stadium into the center for the execution of their court rulings.¹⁸

After the 9/11 attacks at the World Trade Center in New York, the Taliban refused to ask the United States to hand over al-Qaeda's former leader, Osama bin Laden. Subsequently, in October 2001, the Central Intelligence and the US Army launched "Operation Enduring Freedom" to eradicate the Taliban in response to the 9/11 attacks. What happened was the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, not the collapse of the Taliban. Contrary to the heavy presence of international forces in Afghanistan, especially after 2005, violence and unrest have increased in the country, and the Taliban have become more powerful and able to create serious problems for the Afghan government.¹⁹

In the formation and reign of the Taliban, many factors have contributed to the internal and external factors. Among the key factors that can be mentioned include the inability of the PMOI leaders to form a national and national government with the balanced presence of ethnic minorities in power, the military conflicts that began after the capture of Kabul by the Mujahideen in 1992, and By 1996, when the Taliban captured Kabul, the Rabbani government supported the Taliban. Rabbani thought that with the support of the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could take his long and hard rival rival, and then agree on a partnership with the Taliban in power.²⁰ Among the foreign factors, the influence of neighboring Afghanistan, including Pakistan in the jihadist groups, and the financial support of Saudi Arabia and the United States to compete with Iran can be noted.

In sum, we can say that Afghanistan has a traditional and religious community. But the background to politics is not that powerful fundamentalist movement. The lack of fundamentalism, of course, does not mean the importance of religion and its custodians in Afghanistan. Religion and scholars have always been influential in contemporary Afghanistan. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the beginning of jihad, the importance and role of the Ulema in Afghanistan was added. However, they never claimed to take power and set up a political system. Therefore, the existence of traditionalism, the importance of Islam and religious scholars in Afghanistan did not in itself create a political and militant fundamentalist trend. Of course, these could be a good ground for the growth of religious

fundamentalism, but fundamentalist foundations were not found in traditional Afghan society. This field came from and strengthened by the Deobind school in the Indian subcontinent and its followers in Pakistan, and with foreign assistance it came to the conclusion that in some cases the Pakistan's predecessors became more extreme. The Muslim scholars in Pakistan set up this idea through their schools among the Taliban, cultivating it with religious teachings and political affiliations.

Conclusion

The radical Salafist political thought, based on the views of Kharijites, Hanbali and Wahhabis, has a bearing on the rationality among Muslims, because it does not embody any intellectual, Swollen. The most important features of this idea are: a. Limitation of thought and behavior to the appearances of books and hadiths, b. The inability of human intellect to understand religious texts, c. The rejection of the use of new thought and action was due to the absence of their rulings at the dawn of Islam. Strong opposition to Shiite teachings and teachings, which is the source of their Qur'anic verses and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH) and the infallible Imams and their allegiance to the prophetic traditions and divine revelation. This current, which emerged in the contemporary era, called al-Qaeda and the Taliban, is a monopolistic claim of Islamism, which, through the excommunication of other Islamic groups, in particular the Shiites, has legitimized its violent acts against them. It should be recalled that Israel's hostile actions against Muslims and the widespread American support for Israel have been quite effective in attracting various Muslim groups among the Sunni (Islamic countries) to extreme radical movements such as al-Qaeda. In fact, the Salafist-traditionalist movement in the late nineteenth century moved from the field of theoretical and theoretical issues to the sphere of action and gradually turned to violence and eras. The movement, which according to Hisham Sharbi was originally historic, had the image of the "golden age" of the past at the dawn of Islam and the temple of the predecessor, and used it to confront the danger of Europe (the West) and the unity of the Muslims.

Acknowledgements

None.

Conflict of interest

Author declares no conflict of interest.

References

1. Rouhani H. *Familiarity with Islamic Countries*, Tehran: Mashaar Publications; 2009.
2. Alishahi A, Tajik H, Forouzan Y. The reasons of the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan Based on William Bullitt Domino Theory. *The Journal of Geopolitics Quarterly*. 2017;13(1).
3. Hossein M, Ali M, Alishahi A. Explaining the threats to the national security of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Slfysm in both soft and hard macro. *Journal of Strategic Policy Research*. 2017;6(21).
4. Kazemi SA. Investigating the socio-political context of the formation of the Taliban in Pakistan. *Quarterly Journal of History*. 2010;8.
5. Masoudnia H, Najafi D. Factors Influencing the Formation and Growth of Fundamentalism in the Package of the Explanation. *Quarterly Studies on Subcontinent*. 2011;3(8).

6. Polly M, Dowarn K. *Who is bin Laden?* Tehran: Rowzaneh Publications; 2001. p.43-44.
7. Gerges FA. *The Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global?* Britania: Cambridge University Press; 2005.
8. Rawa O. From Ideological Islam to Islamic Nationalism in the Middle East. *Monthly Islam and the West* 3. 1998;3(8).
9. Pillar P. *Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy*. Washington D.C Brookings Institution Press; 2001.
10. Forati AW, Bakhshi SA. Political Islam and Al-Qaeda. *Quarterly of Political Studies in the Islamic World*. 2012;11(2).
11. Mostaghimi B, Ebrahimi N. Principles and Concepts of the Political Islam of Al-Qaeda. *Political Quarterly Journal*. 2010;40(3).
12. Abbas ZF, Mehdi. The Identity Methods of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. *The Political-Economic Quarterly*. 2015;302.
13. Mahmoudian M. The Impact of Non-Muslim Movement Thoughts on the Ideological-Alien-Thought of Al-Qaeda. *The Political Science Journal*. 2012;7(3):86.
14. Dalacoura K. *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press; 2011:40.
15. Burke J. *AlQaeda The True Story of Radical Islam*. London: I.B.Tauris; 2004. p.8-14
16. Cronin AK. How AlQaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups. *International Security*. 2006;31(1).
17. Sinai V, Sadeq AA. The Impact of the Muslim Scholars in Pakistan on the Afghan Taliban. *The Journal of Central Eurasian Studies*. 2014;7(1):102.
18. Mahdavi J. *Political Sociology of Taliban Movement*, Master Thesis, Tehran: Tarbiat Modarres University; 2006: 57
19. Shafiei I, Eidouzaei N. The role of foreign support in the revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan, *Quarterly Studies on Subcontinent*. 2013: 92.
20. Donez A. *Taliban and Global Politics*. Tehran: Taraneh Publications; 1998.