

Relational healing, diagnostic limits, and the misalignment of western psychiatry in indigenous communities: implications for family practice

Abstract

Primary care is the setting where most psychiatric diagnoses are made and where the majority of psychotropic medications are prescribed. This gives family physicians enormous interpretive power: the frameworks they use to understand distress shape diagnostic outcomes, treatment trajectories, and long-term patient identity. For Indigenous patients, this interpretive power carries even greater weight because Western diagnostic systems were not designed to perceive Indigenous relational worlds, historical contexts, or land-based forms of meaning. When applied uncritically, these systems can misclassify relational, communal, or historical suffering as internal pathology and promote pharmacological interventions that are difficult to reverse. This manuscript examines how biological reductionism and diagnostic expansion shape clinical practice in primary care—and how these frameworks fail to perceive Indigenous forms of distress. It argues that Indigenous healing systems provide a more accurate interpretive frame because they reflect the relational, contextual, and historical realities in which suffering and healing occur.

The paper also outlines the physiology of psychiatric-medication withdrawal, emphasizing the relational and neuroadaptive processes that clinicians must understand to support safe tapering when appropriate. Medication practices in primary care often obscure meaning, reinforce diagnostic colonialism, and create long-term dependence through neuroadaptive changes that are frequently misinterpreted as relapse. Healing in Indigenous communities arises from relational accountability, land-based coherence, and intergenerational continuity, while Western psychiatry fragments these dimensions into individualized symptoms. Psychotherapy research further demonstrates that relational factors—not techniques—drive therapeutic change, aligning more closely with Indigenous healing than with manualized Western interventions. The manuscript concludes that primary care clinicians must cultivate contextual knowledge of Indigenous history, culture, and healing practices; adopt reflective and intentional prescribing; recognize withdrawal as a legitimate phase of treatment; and integrate peer support as a core component of care.

Keywords: indigenous relational healing, diagnostic colonialism, psychiatric medication withdrawal, primary care prescribing

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Introduction

Primary care is now the principal setting where emotional distress is interpreted, psychiatric diagnoses are assigned, and psychotropic medications are initiated. This gives family physicians substantial interpretive authority: the frameworks they use shape diagnostic conclusions, treatment trajectories, and long-term patient identity. For Indigenous patients, this interpretive power carries particular weight because the diagnostic and treatment models used in primary care were not designed to perceive Indigenous relational worlds, historical contexts, or land-based dimensions of suffering. When applied uncritically, these models can narrow the meaning of Indigenous distress, misclassify relational or historical experiences as internal pathology, and initiate medication trajectories that are difficult to reverse.¹⁻⁵

Western psychiatry's diagnostic systems—especially the DSM—are often treated as neutral scientific tools, yet they are cultural documents shaped by institutional, political, and historical forces.⁶⁻¹⁰ Their categories lack biomarkers, clear boundaries, and biological validity, and they embed Western assumptions about personhood and pathology. When these categories are imported into primary-care encounters with Indigenous patients, they can obscure relational,

communal, and land-based dimensions of suffering, replacing them with individualized symptom clusters that do not reflect Indigenous understandings of imbalance or wellness.¹¹⁻¹⁵ In practice, experiences that are meaningful within Indigenous communities are frequently reframed as disorders requiring pharmacologic intervention.

Indigenous healing systems offer a fundamentally different orientation. They emphasize relational accountability, land-based coherence, intergenerational continuity, and the restoration of balance. Within these frameworks, suffering emerges from disruptions in relationships—with family, community, ancestors, land, and spirit—rather than from internal defects or neurochemical abnormalities.^{12,15-18} These are not cultural “alternatives” to Western psychiatry; they are coherent epistemologies that more accurately reflect the contexts in which distress and healing occur within Indigenous worlds.

This manuscript examines how diagnostic expansion, biological reductionism, trauma discourse, psychotherapy research, and medication practices intersect within primary care, and how these frameworks can misinterpret Indigenous forms of distress. It argues that Indigenous healing systems must be understood on their own terms and that primary-care clinicians must adopt interpretive models capable of perceiving relational and historical realities.

At the same time, biomedical and pharmacologic approaches remain important components of primary-care practice, particularly for patients who find medications stabilizing or who prefer biomedical explanations of distress. The aim here is not to dismiss these modalities but to situate them within a broader, contextually grounded clinical framework. This includes a brief account of psychiatric medication management—especially the physiology of withdrawal and the clinical reasoning required to guide patients safely through tapering when appropriate. Medication practices in primary care often obscure meaning, reinforce diagnostic colonialism, and create long-term dependence through neuroadaptive processes that clinicians may misinterpret as relapse.

The need for this article stems from a persistent gap in primary care practice, particularly in clinics serving Native American patients. Clinicians are expected to diagnose and treat mental-health conditions using tools that do not account for relational, historical, or land-based dimensions of suffering, while simultaneously managing medications whose long-term effects and withdrawal processes are poorly understood. This combination produces predictable forms of misinterpretation and clinical harm. By bringing together diagnostic critique, relational models of healing, and the clinical realities of psychopharmacologic treatment and withdrawal, this manuscript aims to offer primary-care clinicians a more accurate and contextually grounded understanding of distress and recovery—one that aligns with Indigenous knowledge and reduces the risk of iatrogenic harm.

Diagnostic expansion, validity crisis, and biological reductionism in primary care

Differences in how knowledge and experience are understood shape both diagnostic reasoning and treatment decisions, and these interpretive frameworks ultimately structure the everyday practices of family medicine. Although mainstream psychiatry has begun to question elements of its own dominant approach to mental distress, primary care has not engaged in the same level of critical reflection. Family medicine has a long tradition of holistic practice and a strong emphasis on social determinants of health, yet the psychiatric-biological model is often adopted in primary care settings without an accurate critique.^{19–22} Within this context, clinicians come to rely on DSM categories to guide diagnosis and treatment, even though the DSM is not a neutral scientific system. It is a cultural document shaped by institutional, political, and historical forces, and its categories lack biomarkers, clear boundaries, and biological validity.^{6,7} The continued expansion of diagnoses across DSM editions reflects professional and institutional priorities more than scientific discovery, embedding Western assumptions about pathology into the daily routines of primary care.^{8–10}

These dynamics shape how distress is interpreted and managed. Normal responses to loss, conflict, or structural hardship are reframed as symptoms, and relational forms of suffering are misread as signs of internal pathology. This interpretive shift contributes to higher rates of antidepressant and anxiolytic prescribing, even when the distress reflects social or relational circumstances rather than a discrete medical condition.^{23–26} What is lost in this process is the classic distinction between disease and illness: disease refers to measurable abnormalities in the body, while illness refers to the lived experience of suffering, shaped by relationships, history, and social conditions. The result is a narrowing of meaning and a medicalization of life's challenges. These patterns align with longstanding critiques showing that biomedical frameworks privilege disease over illness, measurable abnormalities over lived experience, and internal pathology over relational meaning.^{27–30}

It is within this broader interpretive frame that the chemical imbalance narrative gained traction, offering a seemingly straightforward explanation for complex forms of suffering and reinforcing the growing emphasis on medication-based responses. Although influential in shaping public and clinical understandings of distress, this narrative has been increasingly questioned in the scientific literature, particularly regarding its adequacy as a framework for understanding the complexity of emotional experience. No psychiatric disorder has a validated biomarker, and no consistent neurotransmitter abnormality has been identified for depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia.^{31–34} Yet the narrative persists because it offers a simple explanation for complex suffering and aligns with pharmaceutical marketing, time-limited visits, and the structural pressures of productivity-driven care.^{35–37}

When diagnostic expansion and biological reductionism are applied to experiences rooted in history, land, and relationships, these realities are collapsed into individualized pathology. Distress emerging from colonial and postcolonial disruption, community loss, or structural inequity is reinterpreted as evidence of a personal disorder. This interpretive shift contributes to overprescribing and long-term medication use, often in the absence of any demonstrated biological abnormality or diagnostic validity—a problem intensified by the conceptual instability of psychiatric categories and the lack of coherent biological anchors.^{38–40}

Limits of western trauma discourse

Trauma has become a dominant framework in contemporary mental-health practice, shaping how clinicians interpret distress and how patients come to understand their own suffering. In primary care, trauma-screening tools and trauma-informed approaches are now widespread. Yet Western trauma narratives carry significant limitations when applied to Indigenous communities. They tend to individualize trauma, locate it within the psyche, and conceptualize it as an internal wound rather than as a disruption of relationships, land, and collective continuity.^{41–45}

Indigenous scholars have long emphasized that trauma cannot be separated from colonization, land dispossession, forced assimilation, boarding schools, and the suppression of ceremony and language.^{15,64–67} These experiences constitute historical trauma—not as a past event but as an ongoing structure that continues to shape Indigenous life. When Western frameworks reduce these realities to PTSD criteria or ACE scores, they collapse collective, historical, and structural forms of suffering into individualized pathology. This interpretive reduction obscures the relational and communal dimensions of Indigenous distress and reinforces diagnostic colonialism.

Western trauma discourse also carries implicit assumptions of cross-cultural uniformity, limiting its ability to recognize the relational, historical, and land-based dimensions through which many Indigenous communities understand and express suffering. Indigenous communities often describe distress through relational imbalance, disrupted kinship, loss of land-based practices, or disconnection from ancestors—dimensions that Western trauma tools are not designed to identify.^{62,68–72} As a result, Indigenous forms of distress may be misinterpreted as psychiatric disorders, leading to medication-based interventions that do not address the underlying relational or historical causes.

This mismatch contributes directly to the medicalization of experiences that are fundamentally relational and historical. Trauma becomes reframed as a psychiatric condition requiring individual therapy or pharmacological treatment, rather than as a disruption

calling for community, ceremony, land-based practices, or relational restoration. In this way, Western trauma categories—especially PTSD—function as reductive classifications that narrow the meaning of Indigenous suffering and channel it into treatment pathways that may inadvertently cause further harm.

Psychotherapy and the centrality of relationship

Psychotherapy research provides one of the strongest empirical challenges to Western psychiatric assumptions. Across decades of studies, meta-analyses, and comparative trials, the consistent finding is that relationship factors—not specific techniques—account for the majority of therapeutic change.^{78–83} Empathy, attunement, trust, collaboration, and the clinician's ability to hold meaning are far more predictive of outcomes than any manualized intervention or theoretical orientation.

These findings align closely with Indigenous healing systems, which emphasize relational accountability, communal coherence, and the restoration of balance. In Indigenous contexts, healing is not a technical procedure but a relational process grounded in reciprocity, responsibility, and connection to land and ancestors.^{12,68,72,75–77} The therapeutic relationship in Western psychotherapy mirrors, in limited form, the relational grounding that Indigenous healing systems cultivate more broadly.

Primary care, however, often adopts a technical, symptom-focused approach to mental health, emphasizing screening tools, diagnostic checklists, and brief interventions. These tools can be useful for structuring care, but they risk reducing complex relational suffering to numerical scores. When clinicians rely on instruments such as the PHQ-9 or the GAD-7 to guide treatment, they may overlook the relational, historical, or communal dimensions of distress—dimensions that Indigenous healing systems place at the center of care.^{34,42,84–86}

Psychotherapy research therefore points toward a more relational orientation in primary care, particularly when working with Indigenous patients. Rather than privileging technique, manualization, or narrow targets of symptom reduction, the evidence suggests that clinicians should privilege meaning, connection, and relational safety as the primary drivers of therapeutic change. Symptom improvement remains important, but it is best understood as emerging from a relational process rather than from the mechanical application of specific methods. This orientation resonates strongly with Indigenous narratives of healing and invites a reconsideration of the dominance of technical, protocol-driven approaches within Western mental-health care.

Medications and relational aspects in family practice

Psychotherapy research shows that healing is carried by relationship rather than technique, and this principle also applies to the use of psychiatric medication. In family practice—where most psychotropics are prescribed—the quality of the relational encounter often shapes both the perceived need for medication and the patient's response to it. A trusted, responsive, and meaning-oriented relationship can make a medication feel stabilizing, while a rushed, fragmented, or confrontational interaction can make the same medication feel destabilizing or unnecessary. In this sense, pharmacologic treatment is never purely biological: its effects are interpreted, mediated, and often transformed through the relational field in which prescribing and tapering occur.

Within this broader clinical landscape, it is also essential to recognize that discontinuation of psychiatric medications—when

appropriate—is not an interruption of treatment but a legitimate phase of care requiring the same level of planning, support, and clinical reasoning as initiation. Deprescribing and withdrawal describe related but distinct phases of medication reduction. Deprescribing refers to the intentional lowering of a dose and does not necessarily aim for full discontinuation, whereas withdrawal names the neurophysiological process that may emerge as the taper moves into its later stages or reaches complete cessation.^{87,88} Both processes involve reducing medications; what differs is their aim and the physiological responses that may arise as doses become lower. In each phase, the clinical task is to guide dose reduction with careful attention to the sensations and meanings that surface.

Clinicians must therefore attend not only to the relational context in which medications are prescribed but also to the biological changes these agents produce over time, particularly when doses are reduced or stopped. Although few clinicians receive formal training in withdrawal physiology, the mechanisms are well described. Withdrawal is not relapse, not the return of an underlying disorder, and not evidence that a patient “needs” the medication. It reflects a predictable neurophysiological response to receptor adaptations shaped by long-term exposure.^{87,88} As the nervous system adjusts to the presence of the drug, it recalibrates receptor sensitivity and signaling; when the dose is lowered or removed, these adaptations must unwind. This process of neuroadaptation can generate sensations that are intense, disorienting, and easily mistaken for a resurgence of illness rather than the body's attempt to restore equilibrium.⁸⁹

For family-practice clinicians, understanding this physiology is essential because misinterpretation is a primary driver of harm. When withdrawal symptoms are mistaken for relapse, clinicians may reinstate the medication, increase the dose, or add additional agents, creating cycles of polypharmacy that obscure the original meaning of distress.⁹⁰ Safe deprescribing requires a shift from linear, time-based tapers to reductions aligned with receptor-occupancy curves.⁹¹ As doses decrease, each reduction represents a proportionally larger change in receptor activity, which explains why patients often tolerate reductions at higher doses but struggle at lower doses. Individualized pacing is therefore not optional; it is the only physiologically coherent approach.^{91,92} Strategic holds help stabilize the nervous system, and pausing during symptom flares helps prevent misdiagnosis. Continuity of care—the relational backbone of family medicine—becomes a protective factor, reducing fear, preventing unnecessary reinstatement, and supporting patients through the nonlinear process of neuroadaptation.⁹³

When tapering is rushed, when medications are stopped abruptly, or when care is fragmented, the risk of harm increases dramatically. This is especially true in Indigenous communities, where relational continuity is not merely a clinical preference but a fundamental cultural necessity. Withdrawal is not simply a biological event; it is a relational process that requires anchoring, predictability, and the presence of trusted others.^{68,82} Without these supports, withdrawal can be frightening, destabilizing, and easily mistaken for relapse—a misinterpretation that often leads to dose escalation, polypharmacy, or long-term dependence.^{90,93} In this sense, deprescribing is not only a technical skill but a relational practice that requires humility, patience, and an understanding of how neurophysiology and relational safety interact.

Deprescribing requires intentionality, and prescribing must be approached with the same deliberate care. The moment of prescribing is not a neutral act; it shapes expectations, future options, and long-term care trajectories. In family practice, where time is limited

and structural pressures are intense, prescribing can easily become automatic—a reflexive response to screening scores, diagnostic labels, or institutional expectations. A pause before prescribing interrupts this reflex. It creates space to ask whether medication is needed at all, and whether the distress in front of the clinician is better understood as relational, historical, or ecological rather than as a condition requiring pharmacological treatment. Many forms of suffering do not benefit from medication, and unnecessary prescribing can obscure meaning, limit agency, and set in motion neuroadaptive processes that later complicate tapering.

A reflective pause allows clinicians to consider what the distress reflects, where it comes from, what relationships it signals, and what histories it carries.⁸⁵ When medication is used, a clearly framed and intentional approach becomes an ethical stance: medications are offered with defined purposes, collaborative expectations, and explicit exit plans. The safest and most responsible policy is to avoid unnecessary prescribing altogether, recognizing that deprescribing begins at the moment of prescribing—not years later, when the patient is already entangled in the web of neuroadaptation.

This need for intentionality in prescribing and deprescribing cannot ignore the valuable input from peer support specialists. They play a role that clinicians cannot replicate. Their knowledge is lived and relational. Peers understand the phenomenology of withdrawal, the fear of destabilization, the uncertainty of tapering, and the emotional complexity of reclaiming agency after long-term medication use.⁸² They help patients interpret sensations, reduce fear, and navigate prescribers. They provide continuity in systems that are often fragmented, rushed, and overburdened. Their role in supporting individuals through psychiatric-medication withdrawal has been increasingly documented.⁸³

Yet the peer workforce often operates within supervision structures that are misaligned with peer functions, which emphasize relational accountability and cultural grounding as essential.^{84,86} In Indigenous contexts, peer support aligns with longstanding relational norms: healing is communal, not individual. Peers assist rather than direct; they validate rather than diagnose; they help individuals reconnect with relational worlds disrupted by trauma, oppression, or medicalization.^{68,82} In the context of tapering, peer support is not optional—it is essential. It provides the relational grounding, continuity, and meaning-making that intentional prescribing and deprescribing require but that clinicians, due to structural constraints, cannot consistently provide.

Informed consent as a relational process

Informed consent in psychiatric prescribing is not a single moment but an evolving dialogue. It requires clinicians to revisit the meaning, purpose, and consequences of medication use as patients' lives and circumstances change. Many individuals begin medications during acute distress, when their capacity to consider long-term implications is limited. Returning to the conversation over time—especially as the original crisis resolves or transforms—becomes an ethical necessity.

This ongoing consent process must include a transparent discussion of long-term effects. Sustained exposure to psychiatric medications produces neuroadaptive changes that shape withdrawal physiology,^{87,88} but it can also generate side effects that accumulate slowly and subtly: emotional blunting, metabolic shifts, sexual dysfunction, and cognitive dulling. These experiences, often minimized in clinical encounters, profoundly shape a person's sense of self and agency. Acknowledging them is part of respecting the patient's autonomy.

Informed consent also requires that alternatives be presented with equal seriousness. Many forms of suffering respond more effectively to relational, psychotherapeutic, cultural, ecological, or community-based interventions than to pharmacological ones. Offering these options is not an anti-medication stance; it is a commitment to clinical integrity and to the principle that medication is one tool among many, not the default response to distress.

Understanding deprescribing and withdrawal

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When tapering becomes clinically and ethically appropriate

The decision to taper is rarely a simple calculation. It becomes appropriate when the original indication has resolved or was time-limited, when the medication no longer provides meaningful benefit, or when its long-term effects begin to overshadow whatever stability it once offered. Sometimes the impulse to reduce arises from the patient's own sense that the medication has come to feel misaligned with their identity, values, or desired way of living. At other times, new medical conditions, pregnancy, or the emergence of side effects prompt a reconsideration of the drug's role.

Safety, in this context, is not a fixed threshold but a relational and physiological condition. A taper is safest when there is continuity of care, when the clinician understands withdrawal physiology well

enough to distinguish neuroadaptation from relapse, and when the pace of reduction can be shaped around the patient's lived experience rather than around an external schedule. The process requires room for pauses, for recalibration, for the nervous system to catch up with each change. It also requires the presence of people who can help interpret sensations that might otherwise feel alarming or disorienting. When these elements are in place—predictable follow-up, a shared understanding of what withdrawal is and is not, and the freedom to slow down when needed—the taper becomes less a technical maneuver and more a collaborative unfolding.

In this sense, the appropriateness and safety of tapering cannot be separated from the quality of the relationship surrounding it. A patient who feels heard, accompanied, and understood is far better positioned to navigate the nonlinear terrain of neuroadaptation than one who feels rushed, dismissed, or alone. The decision to taper is therefore not merely a pharmacological judgment but a relational one: it depends on whether the clinical environment can hold the uncertainties, sensations, and meaning-making that inevitably arise as the body unwinds from long-term exposure.

Relational and cultural dimensions of withdrawal

When tapering is rushed, when medications are stopped abruptly, or when care is fragmented, the risk of harm increases dramatically. This is especially true in Indigenous communities, where relational continuity is not merely a clinical preference but a fundamental cultural necessity. Withdrawal is not simply a biological event; it is a relational process that requires anchoring, predictability, and the presence of trusted others.^{68,82} Without these supports, withdrawal can be frightening, destabilizing, and easily mistaken for relapse—a misinterpretation that often leads to dose escalation, polypharmacy, or long-term dependence.^{90,93} In this sense, deprescribing is not only a technical skill but a relational practice that requires humility, patience, and an understanding of how neurophysiology and relational safety interact.

Intentional prescribing as the foundation of safe deprescribing

Deprescribing requires intentionality, and prescribing must be approached with the same deliberate care. The moment of prescribing is not a neutral act; it shapes expectations, future options, and long-term care trajectories. In family practice, where time is limited and structural pressures are intense, prescribing can easily become automatic—a reflexive response to screening scores, diagnostic labels, or institutional expectations. A pause before prescribing interrupts this reflex. It creates space to ask whether medication is needed at all, and whether the distress in front of the clinician is better understood as relational, historical, or ecological rather than as a condition requiring pharmacological treatment. Many forms of suffering do not benefit from medication, and unnecessary prescribing can obscure meaning, limit agency, and set in motion neuroadaptive processes that later complicate tapering.

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The essential role of peer support

This need for intentionality in prescribing and deprescribing cannot ignore the valuable input from peer support specialists. They play a role that clinicians cannot replicate. Their knowledge is lived and relational. Peers understand the phenomenology of withdrawal, the fear of destabilization, the uncertainty of tapering, and the emotional complexity of reclaiming agency after long-term medication use.⁸² They help patients interpret sensations, reduce fear, and navigate prescribers. They provide continuity in systems that are often fragmented, rushed, and overburdened. Their role in supporting individuals through psychiatric-medication withdrawal has been increasingly documented.⁸³

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Conclusion

Family practice clinicians occupy a pivotal role in shaping how Indigenous suffering is interpreted, named, and treated. The stakes could not be higher. In many Indigenous communities, the family physician is the first—and sometimes the only—point of clinical contact. The interpretive frameworks clinicians bring into the encounter, therefore, carry enormous weight. They can illuminate the relational, historical, and communal dimensions of distress, or obscure them beneath diagnostic labels never designed to capture Indigenous realities.

Healing in Indigenous communities arises from a dense web of relationships—with family, community, ancestors, land, and future generations. It is communal, land-connected, and grounded in sovereignty, sustained through responsibilities that link people across time and place. Western diagnostic tools often struggle to register relational imbalance, historical trauma, ecological disruption, or intergenerational continuity—dimensions that are central to Indigenous understandings of distress. When Western frameworks become the primary lens for interpreting experience, they can inadvertently separate what Indigenous worlds hold together, fragmenting forms of suffering that are best understood within a relational, historical, and land-based whole.

For these reasons, psychotherapy in Indigenous contexts must be relational rather than technical. Medication must be cautious, intentional, and time-limited. Withdrawal must be recognized as a phase of treatment, not a sign of relapse, and understood as a predictable neurophysiological process that requires guidance, pacing, and relational support. When individuals taper off medications, they are not “failing treatment” but moving through a stage of recovery that involves the gradual unwinding of receptor adaptations created by long-term exposure. This phase demands careful accompaniment, strategic holds, and the presence of trusted relationships—conditions that help prevent misinterpretation of withdrawal symptoms as a return of illness and reduce the risk of unnecessary reinstatement or polypharmacy. In Indigenous communities, where healing is

fundamentally relational, withdrawal is most safely navigated when clinicians, peers, and community supports work together to provide continuity, anchoring, and culturally grounded meaning-making throughout the process.

Peer support must be integrated as a core component of care, not an optional adjunct. These are not stylistic preferences; they are clinical imperatives grounded in the physiology of pharmacologic treatment and the relational foundations of Indigenous healing.

But there is a deeper requirement—one that cannot be reduced to technique or protocol. Family physicians working with Indigenous communities must cultivate a contextual understanding of Indigenous history, culture, and healing practices. This is a clinical necessity. Without an understanding of colonization, land dispossession, boarding schools, forced assimilation, and the suppression of ceremony and language, clinicians cannot accurately interpret the meaning of distress. Without an understanding of kinship systems, relational obligations, land-based practices, and the role of ancestors, clinicians cannot recognize the relational worlds in which suffering and healing unfold.

This contextual knowledge is not acquired through a single training. It emerges from reading Indigenous scholarship, listening to Native leaders, attending community events and conferences, engaging with tribal health workers, and learning directly from patients who are willing to teach. These practices deepen clinical judgment, prevent misdiagnosis, and allow clinicians to see what Western tools cannot see—the relational, communal, ecological, and intergenerational dimensions of distress that are central to Indigenous life.

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Conflicts of interest

The author declares there is no conflict of interest.

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