

Creativity as an unconscious response of the psyche to a problem and as conscious work of the individual

Abstract

The study is motivated by two circumstances: first, a polemic with the concept of “impersonal” creativity, going back to M. Tsvetaeva’s ideas about the poet as a “receiver” of higher forces, as well as to the views of G.P. Shchedrovitsky. Second, the creation and development of large language models of AI, which demonstrate abilities previously considered the exclusive prerogative of humans—to generate new knowledge and create semiotic constructions. The central problem of the article is formulated as the question of the relationship between conscious and unconscious mechanisms in processes of creativity, and also of the extent to which man is a subject and to what extent a “medium” or anthropological condition of generated meanings. To solve this task, a methodological approach is proposed that combines the author’s concept of dreaming (which is generalized and corrected) and the author’s concept of “schemology” (a theory of the invention of complex signs that allow problematic situations to be resolved). Three diverse cases are chosen as the empirical base: 1) the adolescent visionary experience of C.G. Jung, where the author analyzes the mechanism of the psyche’s “response” to a latent conflict with subsequent conscious schematization; 2) the religious crisis of the God-seeker Akimushka, demonstrating the cyclical change of schemes (“God exists” / “God does not exist”) as a way of survival under conditions of existential vacuum; 3) the metaphysical construction of worlds by E. Swedenborg, where scientific thinking and spiritual “visions” intertwine in a hybrid process of constructing a new reality. Of special interest is the comparison of Swedenborg’s creativity and Kant’s, as well as drawing parallels with the work of neural networks. The author concludes that creativity is reducible neither to the pure spontaneity of “Nothingness” (S. Neretina) nor to the compilation of data. Creativity is interpreted as a complex hybrid process, where unconscious activity (realization of blocked programs, hallucinations, daydreams) supplies the “raw material”—images and visions—and consciousness (intellect, logic, cultural norms) performs the function of correction and schematization, turning this material into universally valid knowledge or a work. The article actually substantiates the assumption that the innovation of AI is structurally similar to human creativity. A neural network operates with hidden connections (“weights”), learning on enormous datasets (which can be correlated with unconscious natural processes and conscious activity), but it is deprived of the existential experience of problematic situations, which fundamentally distinguishes machine generation from the anthropological creative act.

Keywords: natural, unconscious, artificial, activity, program, problem, resolution, creativity, correction, dreams

Volume 8 Issue 3 - 2026

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Received: September 19, 2026 | **Published:** October 22, 2026

Introduction

Two circumstances have once again inclined the author to discuss the nature of creativity: first, remarks by Prof. Svetlana Neretina concerning the author’s reflection on composing poetry; second, the author’s study of the structure and operation of neural networks. S. Neretina, in particular, commented on the Internet on the author’s reflection of poetic experience as follows. “You are a great constructivist! You construct poems and comment on them yourself, like Holy Scripture (Dante did this—read in the book, but he rather ‘wrote them down’—which is why it required commentary—rather than composing them). You have a very strong material foundation, whereas I, if I speak of the matter of art (from nothing means taking matter as an aid, copper, for example, for a statue), do so in order to embody the non-dense. With you, flesh is primordial. <...> I still believe that poetry is the best, the highest; intense word passes through a person like electricity—you are its receiver. ...I still think that we are not the creators of the word.”

It turns out that my creativity is directed by someone, not by me, and proceeds “from nothing,” “from Nothingness.” “The first sign of the created,” writes Neretina, analyzing Lermontov’s creativity, “is stuffiness, boundness. The first sign of nothingness is freedom. Nothingness is the negative, the world is the positive.” As a negative, it is prior to the world... [5, p. 107].

However, not only Neretina thinks so; Marina Tsvetaeva also says: “The artist’s timidity before the thing. He forgets that it is not he who writes. The word of Vyacheslav Ivanov to me—‘Only begin! By the third page you will be convinced that there is no freedom at all’—that is: I will find myself in the power of things, that is, in the power of a demon, that is, only an obedient servant<...> And the share of will in all this? Oh, enormous. At least not to despair when you wait for weather by the sea<...> My will is hearing, not to tire of listening until you hear, and not to write down anything you have not heard”.¹ “Nothingness,” “demon,” “power of things” determine our creativity! Then what is the role of man, and what are these demons? Now, what does artificial intelligence have to do with it

It has to do with the fact that this complex semiotic machine created by man seemingly also creates, or at least not only adequately understands our requests (“prompts”) and reasonably responds to them, but also creates new knowledge. In the recently published book “These Strange New Minds: How AI Learned to Speak and What It Means,” its author Christopher Summerfield explains: “The new world into which we are about to plunge is a world where AI systems are appointed guardians of almost all human knowledge and endowed with the ability to reason about it as a human does. This means that we have created artificial intelligence systems potentially capable of advancing new theories, making discoveries, and displaying creative abilities that were formerly the exclusive prerogative of humans. This world has arrived because, in just the last few years, researchers have created computer tools that have access to colossal amounts of data and are able to speak about them in ‘natural’ language—using the same words and phrases with which people discuss, think over, and share new discoveries. This amazing innovation—machines that possess language—serves as the engine of a technological revolution that will change our future. No one knows for sure what awaits us, but AI is developing at such dizzying speed that we probably will not have to wait long to find out”.²

There is a point of view that artificial neural networks, learning on data created by humans, are fundamentally incapable of creating anything new; the result of their activity is merely a complexly arranged compilation of processed material. My analysis shows that this is not so. Yes, tuning and training proceed on the basis of “datasets” where texts (schemes, thought constructions, works, etc.) obtained in already established intellectual practices are collected. But they were collected by specialists using the Internet. That alone can introduce certain new connections (of meanings and contents). Further, the organization of the neural network is multilayered; modeling and construction of prompts is ensured by parallel work unfolding in these layers, and the use of the Internet can bring in additional information and schemes. As a result, in the neural network there are possibilities for constructions that the user perceives as innovations, as creativity, although this is simply the potential of the structure and operation of AI. The question: perhaps man is not needed at all, since he can be replaced by programming, datasets, prompt modeling, “transformers” that allow contexts, exceptions, and semantic connections of words to be taken into account.

“Language modeling,” writes Summerfield, “like weather forecasting, is primarily the ability to figure out what is connected with what. Analyzing sentences is difficult because the connections in the sequence of input data often become obvious only in hindsight. The transformer surpasses other models in language modeling because... it swallows the query as a whole. This allows it to use self-attention to determine how each word relates to all other preceding words (and its specific position in the sentence)... Parallel processing (with the attention mechanism) in the transformer facilitates the grasping of these subtle hidden currents in the meaning of a sentence—again because, thanks to self-attention, it can analyze context ‘in hindsight,’ which allows it to understand which parts of the sentence are connected with each other... By layering transformers on top of one another, where each uses the self-attention mechanism, we can pass language through a kind of ‘computational skyscraper’ that reveals the connections of each word in any position with all the others. In combination with gigantic volumes of training data, these innovations allow LLMs (large language models—V.R.) to model very distant connections in a text—not simply to understand that tree points to one meaning of the word bark, and dog to another (bark), but also to catch much deeper semantic connections in long prose passages”.²

There are, of course, other problems and questions concerning the nature of creativity, for example, whether creativity can be reduced to the creation of the new, how the latter is to be understood, who determines whether what has been created is new or a well-forgotten old thing, whether the creation of the new represents a regularity (one can imagine it as such) or is a singularity, and others. But we will limit ourselves only to the problems of the conditioning of creativity (describing and interpreting anthropological and cultural-environmental conditions and processes). At the same time, in order to obtain facts and formulate hypotheses, we will consider several cases of creativity. In analyzing them, the author’s concepts of dreams, schemes, and the psyche will be used.³⁻⁶

Analysis of cases of creativity

First case. Karl Jung’s Clarification of Disturbed Perception as an Act of Creativity

In his last book, “Memories, Dreams, Reflections,” the psychologist describes one of his adolescent experiences dating to 1887. Jung tells how one day he saw God, and what happened afterward.

“The world is beautiful, and the church is beautiful,” Jung recalls, “and God, who created all this, sits far, far away in the blue sky on a golden throne and ... Here my thoughts broke off and I felt suffocation. I froze and remembered only one thing: Don’t think now! Something terrible is coming.

(After three days, accompanied by complex experiences, Jung decided to return to the vision that had frightened him.—V.R.).

I gathered all my courage, as if I had suddenly decided to immediately jump into hellfire, and gave the thought a chance to appear. I saw before me a cathedral, the blue sky. God sits on his golden throne, high above the world—and from under the throne a piece of excrement falls onto the shining new roof of the cathedral, pierces it, everything collapses, the walls of the cathedral break into pieces.

That was it! I felt inexpressible relief. Instead of the expected curse, grace descended upon me, and with it an inexpressible bliss that I had never known... I understood much that I had not understood before, I understood what my father had never understood—the will of God... My father accepted biblical commandments as a guide, he believed in God as the Bible prescribed and as his father taught him. But he did not know the living God, who stands, free and omnipotent, stands above the Bible and above the Church, who calls people to become equally free. God, in order to fulfill His Will, can force the father to abandon all his views and convictions. Testing human courage, God forces one to renounce traditions, however sacred they may be”.⁷

To understand what happened to Jung, two circumstances must be taken into account. First, Jung’s negative attitude, by the time of the situation described here, toward the church and his own father (who served as a pastor). The church did not justify his hopes, and his father, in Jung’s opinion, having doubts about faith, closed his eyes to them while continuing to perform his duties. The second circumstance was probably conditioned by the first. Soon after what happened, Jung broke with the church and his father. “In this religion,” writes Jung, “I no longer found God. I knew that I could never again take part in this ceremony. The church is a place I will no longer go to. Everything there is dead, there is no life there. I was overcome with pity for my father. I realized the whole tragedy of his profession and life. He struggled with death, whose existence he could not acknowledge. Between him and me a chasm opened, it was boundless, and I saw no possibility of ever overcoming it” [ibid., p. 64].

Let us comment on this case. Note that first there is a response of the psyche (the vision of how God in an obscene manner destroys the church), probably to Jung's established negative attitude, and then after three days he constructs an explanation of this vision, which, in the author's concept, can be understood as the construction of a "semiotic scheme." In the book "Introduction to Schemology: Schemes in Philosophy, Culture, Science, Design" I show that the transition from problems ("problem situations") to understanding what is happening (and simultaneously "new reality" and action) occurs through the invention of complex signs (schemes) that allow the problem situation to be resolved. In this case, one can assume that the problem situation was Jung's latent desire to break with the church and his father (latent, unconscious, since Jung was a believer, and such an act would be perceived by his environment as terrible and impossible).

But the resolution of this problem situation began not with the construction of a scheme (it is articulated by Jung only after three days), but, as we see, with a response (reaction) of the psyche. In the author's concept of dreaming, such a response can be represented as a daydream or hallucination. [pp. 246–248] I will make a digression to explain dreaming.

Dreaming Is Contemplation in Sleep of the Unconscious Realization of Blocked Programs of Human Activity

In waking life, our desires, which resemble programs (not computer programs, but psychobiological ones), are realized under the conditions of human activity, the work of consciousness and the five senses. For example, I have set myself to fly to another city by plane, i.e., in this case this is the motive of my activity. Under its influence, events set by language are built up in my consciousness (I will get ready, buy a ticket, go to the airport, board the plane, etc., etc.). This is an intellectual and psychobiological (since my organism tunes itself to the coming events) program, which, if there are no obstacles, I begin to realize (get ready, go to buy a ticket, etc.). Realization presupposes actual activity and living through corresponding events. For example, buying a ticket is the carrying out of certain actions, accompanied by perception, recognition, experiences, and many other mental processes, which together can be called "living-through" events. As a result of realizing what was intended (desire-motive), the program exhausts itself and ceases to exist.³

But there are often situations in which psychic desire-programs cannot be realized for various reasons (there are no means for carrying out the activity; realization contradicts the attitudes of consciousness, as, for example, Z. Freud believed, etc.). In this case, desires, as psychologists say, are "blocked"; so as not to interfere with current life activity, they are transferred to another horizon of the psyche, where they await their hour. This hour comes during biological sleep, when consciousness is either completely or partially blocked, but the possibilities for realizing blocked desire-programs open up, though under different conditions than if they were realized during waking life and with the necessary conditions.³

Realization is now carried out not through the work of the senses, consciousness, and activity, but through the actualization of past experience and semiotics connected with this work, which support it. For example, in a dream I fly on an airplane, and sometimes I fly like a bird, and the events of the flight represent an actualization in the psyche of the semiotic and "psychic experience" of my real once or imagined flight. This experience is engaged in language and in the connections of the cells of my brain. By the way, neural networks were created in a similar way: neurons of the brain and their work were modeled with the help of programs, the "weights" of connections between

neurons were tuned, events indicated by the user were modeled in mathematical schemes, etc. Since in sleep consciousness and the work of the senses are blocked, the psyche, creating conditions for the realization of blocked desire-programs, uses psychic experience, ignoring external reality and reasonable considerations characteristic of waking life. Therefore, in sleep we can fly like birds and do many other impossible things, since we live through not real events but semiotic and psychic experience in unusual combinations.

If consciousness in sleep is not completely blocked, then we can spy on the realization of blocked desire-programs; this is what dream-visions are.³ In this case consciousness does not control the realization of desires as during waking life, but works only in the mode of contemplation (seeing). Finally, if there are no possibilities for realizing blocked desires in sleep (for example, if for some reason we do not sleep for a long time), the psyche switches to the mode of realizing blocked desires "here and now," regardless of the ongoing work of consciousness, feelings, and the possibility of carrying out activity. Jung's fantasy and visions belong precisely to this case. The author shows that such cases represent phenomena that we call daydreams and hallucinations. Here there is a realization of two psychic processes at once: blocked desires and desire-programs of ordinary waking life.

An important hypothesis: one can assume that the *realization of ordinary desire-programs is also carried out using established psychic experience and attitudes toward their living-through (realization)*, only in this case the attraction of such experience and its realization *are corrected by the work of consciousness, feelings, and activity*. For example, it was precisely this correction that Jung engaged in for three days after the strange vision that visited him. But the canonical God of the church and the father could not destroy his house, the church. But what if God resembles a revolutionary? Such a God already suited Jung. That was the main correction—the revolutionary God could give sanction for the break with the church and the father-pastor. This correction was expressed and fixed in language, in the scheme that Jung creates and articulates after three days.

Let us note: in sleep the realization of blocked programs is carried out (proceeds) by itself, representing a complex psychobiological, but, what is fundamental, *natural* process. In waking life, corrections of consciousness, the work of feelings, and activity intrude into this process, changing it.

Let us recall that Tsvetaeva points out that it is not she herself who composes poems, and Neretina says, "we are not the creators of the word," and my teacher, the well-known philosopher G.P. Shchedrovitsky, asserted that it is not we who think, but impersonal thinking. "From all sides," he wrote at the end of his life, "I hear: man! <...> personality! <...> All this is a lie: I am a vessel with living, self-developing thinking, I am thinking thinking, its hypostasis and materialization, an organism of thought. And nothing more <...> I always imply one thing: I am a knecht, a servant of my thinking, and beyond that there are actions of thinking, mine and others', which, in particular, communicate. At some moment—I was then about twenty—I felt an amazing transformation that happened to me: I understood that thinking had landed on me and that this is my value and my, as a human being, essence <...> All our behavior is merely a reflection and imprint of the power of the sociocultural forms we use, but in no way the creation of an individual mind. And in this sense I say: play plays, and thinking thinks" [13, pp. 9, 12].

And they would be right if the resolution of our problems, including the most ordinary desires, were carried out exclusively in sleep. But

they are carried out not in sleep but in waking life and in our creativity. In creativity two planes are involved at once: conscious activity and unconscious realization of desire-programs, with the latter correcting the former. Usually we do not notice our unconscious activity; it is hidden behind activity, but in some cases, similar to the Jungian one, unconscious and conscious activities diverge in time, and sometimes also in product (created objects). The fact is that both of these activities often culminate in a new vision of reality. For example, both the fantasy that visited Jung pointed to God and his strange actions, and the scheme that Jung constructed depicted a similar picture. But in fact God was already different, which Jung clearly expressed, saying that his father did not know “the living God, who stands, free and omnipotent, stands above the Bible and above the Church, calling people to become equally free.” Possibly, such contradictions and non-coincidences of the objects created in creativity (in unconscious and conscious activity) are one of the mechanisms of creativity. Creative activity generates them, and simultaneously situations crystallize that require the resolution of these non-coincidences and contradictions.

Second Case. The Story with Akimushka

In Nikolai Berdyaev’s “Self-knowledge” I read the recollection of the folk God-seeker Akimushka about an incident that happened to him in adolescence. “He was a shepherd,” recalled Akimushka, “and was pasturing the flock. And suddenly he had the thought that God does not exist. Then the sun began to fade, and he plunged into darkness. He seemed to have gone completely blind. Then in the depths of nothingness and darkness light began to kindle, he again believed that God exists, ‘nothing’ turned into the world, brightly illuminated by the sun, everything was restored in a new light” [1, p. 188].

Probably Akimushka was a deeply religious adolescent. Nevertheless, he had heard from someone statements that “God does not exist,” and the thought involuntarily crept into Akimushka’s head, “maybe this is true”? This doubt, under the condition of faith, constituted the problem situation. Akimushka resolved the problem by inventing the scheme “God does not exist.” It set a new reality (a world without God), forcing Akimushka to revise his “life-world”: if God does not exist (after all, He created everything), then there is nothing. Living through and experiencing the events of such a world entailed a natural activity that paralyzed all of Akimushka’s sensuality (he went blind, plunged into darkness). A new problem situation crystallized—the desire to live under the condition of absolute darkness. Akimushka resolves it by creating the scheme “God exists.” The reality set by this second scheme entailed the restoration of Akimushka’s sensuality (light kindles, the world returns). As we see, in this case the unconscious and conscious activity of the individual intertwine and condition each other.

Third Case. The Spiritual World and Nature—Two Planes of World Reality of Emanuel Swedenborg

The well-known Swedish scientist, engineer, and after age 56 no less known Christian esotericist E. Swedenborg created in the early 18th century. By age fifty-five Swedenborg had published twenty-five volumes of research on mineralogy, anatomy, and geometry. “Sciences,” writes Jorge Luis Borges, “interested Swedenborg primarily in their practical application. Subsequently it was discovered that he anticipated many later ideas, for example the Kant-Laplace nebular hypothesis. Moreover, like Leonardo da Vinci, Swedenborg made a drawing of a flying apparatus. He knew that this could not have practical application, but regarded his work as a starting point for creating what we now call airplanes. Swedenborg also made a

drawing of an apparatus capable of swimming underwater; Francis Bacon had written about such a thing. Then he became interested—also an extraordinary enthusiasm—in mineralogy. He was an assessor of the Mining College in Stockholm, but anatomy also attracted him. Like Descartes, he tried to determine the place where spirit connects with body” [2, pp. 520–521].

Having left science, Swedenborg, as he asserts, on the instruction of Christ visited heavens and hell, observed the Lord, conversed with angels and demons, and as a scientist studied the structure of the world and described it in his books. In Swedenborg’s teaching God is not a Trinity but a single being, people as spirits (angels or demons) are immortal, not only those attached to the faith are saved but all who live righteously; in world reality one can see two hypostases—spiritual (God, heavens and hell, angels and demons) and natural (nature). “In a word,” writes Swedenborg, “everything that is in nature, from the smallest object to the greatest, is a correspondence; because the natural world with all its belongings borrows its being and existence from the spiritual world, and that one and the other from the Divine... Who after this, thinking at least a little according to sound reason, will say that all these miracles are not from the spiritual world, to which the natural serves as a bodily shell or in order to present the spiritual cause in material manifestation” [11, pp. 54–55].

“The world of spirits differs both from the world of heavens and from hell; it is a place or state intermediate between the two: there a person comes after his death and, having stayed there for a certain period, according to his life on earth, either ascends to the heavens or is cast down into hell” [ibid., p. 220]. “The soul of man, about whose immortality so much has been written, is his very spirit; it is immortal in all its integrity... every person according to his spirit is already in his bodily life in the company of spirits, although he does not know this... man, dying, passes only from one world to another. That is why death in the Word of God in the internal sense means resurrection and life” [ibid., pp. 224, 229, 247].

Immanuel Kant, who retold Swedenborg’s teaching, concluded that such a world does not exist, and that Swedenborg only imagined all this, if not worse—he went mad. “Therefore,” writes Kant, “I will not at all condemn the reader if he, instead of considering visionaries as half belonging to another world, immediately enrolls them as candidates for treatment in a hospital and thus saves himself from any further investigation... in Swedenborg’s work I find that very whimsical play of imagination that many other amateurs found in the play of nature, when in the outlines of spotted marble they pictured the Holy Family or in stalactite formations—monks, fonts, and church organs... I am tired of citing the wild ravings of the worst of all fantasists or continuing them up to his description of the state after death... it would be futile to try to hide the fruitlessness of all this labor—it strikes the eye of everyone” [4, pp. 327, 340, 347].

How so, incomprehensible, because Swedenborg was a world-class scientist, he was even compared with Newton, doctors do not testify to a disturbance of his psyche, the logic and Christian ethics in his spiritual teaching are impeccable, many noted this, for example V. Solovyov and Borges; Swedenborg’s Christian faith, of course, differed from the canonical, but Kant also understood God non-canonically, as a philosopher. I had, he writes, “to limit (aufheben) knowledge in order to make room for faith”; in fact Kant allowed a conditional (“regulative”) being of God as the highest ground of pure reason. “As if,” writes Kant, “the totality of all appearances (the sensibly perceived world itself) had outside its scope one highest and all-sufficient ground, namely as if a self-subsistent, original and creative reason, in relation to which we direct all empirical use of our

reason in its greatest breadth as if the objects themselves arose from this archetype of all reason" [3, p. 572].

Therefore, I think it is worth considering Swedenborg's creativity (understanding how he arrived at the picture of the structure of the world), using the distinctions and concepts given above. Here is the key to understanding Swedenborg's life evolution: at this time in culture there appear individuals belonging simultaneously to two realities (worlds)—spiritual, religious, and scientific, rational. Our hero received an excellent double education: religious in the family (his father, Lutheran pastor Jesper Swedberg, was appointed rector of the cathedral and professor at Uppsala University) and natural-scientific (he graduated from this university, defending a work on philosophy; in 1710 he went for an internship abroad, where he spent 5 years mastering mathematics, mechanics, astronomy with leading scientists of Holland, France, England).

What an education, such a life! Swedenborg equally recognized both realities, which is visible in his texts, where on many scientific, engineering, and philosophical manuscripts at the bottom of the pages there is the following instruction to himself:

"1. Often read the Word of God and reflect on it.

A. Submit oneself in all things to the will of Divine providence.

B. Observe in all actions true propriety and always keep an impeccable conscience.

C. Fulfill honestly and truthfully the duties of one's calling and the debt of service, and strive to make oneself in all respects a useful member of society" [11, p. 4].

Over the years Swedenborg, as a scientist and philosopher, began to notice troubles in the religious picture of the world. What does it mean that God is a Trinity (from the point of view of Aristotelian logic this is a contradiction); how is the resurrection of the individual possible (as a physicist Swedenborg could not conceive of creating man from nothing); why will only believers be saved, and other people who live righteously? This is one problem existential situation. But the picture of nature for Swedenborg was also not free of problems. For example, where did the laws of nature come from? This is a second, no less existential problem.

If one judges by the picture described in Swedenborg's books (there is heaven, where angels dwell, and hell with demons, and the latter want to seize the heavenly abode and destroy it, but God does not allow this, maintaining the balance of forces), then one can assume that first Swedenborg, similar to what happened with young Jung, had a vision of the picture of these two worlds and God, not allowing demons to gain victory over angels. This picture was produced by Swedenborg's psyche (without his conscious activity) as a response to the two indicated existential problems.

But then Swedenborg began to correct it, applying all his knowledge and competencies, as a Cartesian philosopher and scientist. For example, what God is reported in his vision? Not a Trinity, that is a contradiction. Swedenborg resolves this next problem by creating the scheme of a single God. "I often," he writes, "spoke about this with angels, and they constantly answered me that in heaven they cannot divide the Divine (principle) into three, for they know and comprehend that the Divine (principle) is one and that it is one in the Lord" [11, p. 15]. How do people get to heaven, becoming angels, while others go to hell, to turn into demons? Rationally this cannot be explained. Resolving this problem, Swedenborg creates the scheme of man as an immortal spirit.

At the same time one should not think that it was possible to create schemes without relying on natural psychic processes. (And there are many schemes in Swedenborg's constructions, as I show in the book "Demarcation of Science and Religion: Analysis of the Teaching and Creativity of Emanuel Swedenborg.") For example, there was a medieval idea of God as Spirit and man as spirit, created in the image and likeness of God. It was precisely this picture that could have appeared to Swedenborg in the process of creating the scheme of man as spirit. All schemes are created on the wave of natural psychic processes that are responses to problems. In the logic of the Aristotelian division into the natural and human activity, these responses are carried out outside the conscious activity of man, by themselves, representing an anthropological answer to the problem situation. But the construction of schemes is already a hybrid process in which these responses and the conscious activity of man converge.

So Swedenborg begins to correct his visions, which results in the construction, alongside the pictures of the spiritual world and nature, of yet another picture where all contradictions are already removed and problems resolved. However, not all; there remains one more, at which Kant aimed, namely, how to prove, relying on facts (after all, Swedenborg addresses the new picture to modern man, who grew up on experimental natural sciences), that the new picture of the world is based precisely on facts, that it is not Swedenborg's fantasy. This situation is indeed the problem of problems; it was impossible to resolve it, because not one of Swedenborg's propositions could be proven experimentally.

I think Swedenborg suffered for a long time, unsuccessfully trying to resolve the new problem situation, until his own psyche came to his aid. It began to produce daydreams on the theme of grounding all Swedenborgian constructions. But these dreams, perceived as reality, were expressed with the help of schemes, for example, such in which Christ gave Swedenborg the task of renewing the Christian church, or as testimonies of Swedenborg himself and angels, which, according to Swedenborg's conviction, could not but be perceived as objective facts.

"Now," writes Swedenborg, "let us turn to experience. That angels have a human form, that is, that they are the same people, this I have seen up to a thousand times: I talked with them as a man with a man, sometimes with one, sometimes with many together, and never did I see that their external form differed in anything from the human; sometimes I was amazed at this; but so that this would not be attributed to deception of the senses or imagination, I was given to see them in reality, with full consciousness of the senses and in a state of clear comprehension" [11, p. 42].

So, in grounding the proposed new picture of the world, Swedenborg closed all his constructions on his own natural, unconscious psychic processes, which Kant correctly caught, asserting that his opponent had gone mad. The other thing is that from the point of view of the logic of creativity, Kant's constructions did not go far from Swedenborgian ones. The same two hypostases—natural, unconscious psychic processes and conscious activity (including corrections of unconscious structures), similar hybrid construction of a new picture of the world. The difference, as I show in the article "'Critique of Pure Reason' by I. Kant: Sources of Historical Influence and Features of Discourse," is different: different problem situations, other ways of resolving them, and, besides, Kant closes his constructions not on his own unconscious psychic processes but on the objective experience of culture. For example, in his concept of pure reason he includes the distinction of understanding and reason, which corresponded to the

really established relations between philosophy, logic, and science; in the criterion of obtaining contradictions—going beyond experience (here he includes Swedenborg's works); in the understanding of personality—triple determination (by natural laws, free choice, and following duty, understood as submission to European law and values).^{8–14}

Conclusion

The analysis allows us to draw several conclusions that substantially refine the modern understanding of creative activity. First, the empirical cases convincingly show that creativity is not exclusively a volitional act of consciousness or, conversely, a passive transmission of “divine” or “demonic” signals. On the material of the phenomena of Jung, Akimushka, and Swedenborg, the author demonstrates that any creative act is launched by a problem situation, to which the psyche reacts in two interconnected ways: an unconscious “response” (image, vision, daydream) and a conscious construction of semiotic schemes.

Second, the author's proposed model of “psychobiological programs” allows a new look at the nature of inspiration. If in peripheral cases (such as Swedenborg's hallucinations or Jung's dreams) the realization of blocked desires occurs bypassing the censorship of consciousness, then in the classical case of “normal creativity” (science, art) there is an overlay of two processes: unconscious generation of images is constantly corrected by intellect, cultural norms, and requirements of logic. It is this “hybrid” that the author considers the essence of creativity, and one of the mechanisms of development—the generation of contradictions between the two obtained pictures of reality and their subsequent resolution through new schematization.

Third, turning to the phenomenon of artificial intelligence, one can arrive at the following distinction. Neural networks indeed demonstrate formally similar mechanisms: they work in parallel with several layers of data, reveal hidden contextual connections (the “self-attention” program), are capable of generating new combinations perceived as innovations. However, the key difference, according to the author, lies in the plane of ontology and motivation. Human creativity is rooted in the existential experience of a problem situation (fear of death, doubt in faith, conflict with authorities), whereas AI is deprived of “living” psychic experience and does not experience the blocking of its own desires. Consequently, AI generates novelty as a structural potential of the system, but not as a response to a personal challenge of being.

In the end, the article asserts that the “creator” in the classical understanding is neither a transcendental subject nor a passive vessel, but a complex cultural and psychobiological mediator. Creativity appears as a dynamic equilibrium between the elemental play of the psyche and the disciplining work of schematization. This approach not only removes the contradiction between S. Neretina's position (“we do not create”) and the position of scientists (“we create everything”) but also offers a heuristic toolkit for analyzing both historical forms

of creativity and modern challenges associated with the “creativity” of machines. The concluding conclusion of the work sounds moderately optimistic: man is not reducible to an algorithm precisely because his creativity is rooted in finitude, tragedy, and freedom of choice, which cannot be simulated by a transformer, however complex it may be.

Acknowledgements

None.

Conflict of interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Funding

None.

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