Review Article

Ontology of knowledge and ontology of faith

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Received: February 07, 2023 | **Published:** March 02, 2023

Introduction

The problem of the correlation of "knowledge" and "faith" took shape in the middle Ages. "Knowledge" symbolized philosophy, "faith" religion. The absolute priority of "faith" over "knowledge", religion over philosophy was recognized. During the Renaissance, the primacy is increasingly shifting to "knowledge", represented by philosophy in increasing alliance with science, cognizing the world and contributing to its transformation by man. On this basis, the opposite of the "ontology of knowledge" and the "ontology of faith" is formed. Philosophy, being located between science and religion, connects the initial foundations, the "principles" of existence, which "knowledge" reveals, with the final goals of human existence, which are formed as a program of activity, normative for a particular epoch.

In the middle Ages, the activity programs were dominated by religious teachings. Therefore, the believer then began to act as if God existed. And this situation turned out to be regardless of whether he exists or not. In this article, the author addresses knowledge and faith, revealing their ontological essence. At the same time, in methodological terms, he relies on dialectics, especially on the method of unity of historical and logical, complementing it with the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete.

Today, mythological, religious and philosophical views compete on the worldview field. The greatest activity, and not without success, is shown by representatives of the religious worldview, and atheists miss the mark when they deny the existence of God, recognizing only the idea of God. After all, a believer acts as if God exists. Whether it exists or not.

This statement can be confirmed, for example, by an episode from the childhood of the world-famous logician, sociologist and writer A.A. Zinoviev. His mother was a religious person, and the boy had a pectoral cross. In 1929, when he went to school, there were regular full hygienic examinations of children who were stripped naked. In order not to become an object of ridicule, he took off his pectoral cross and threw it away. The mother entered into the situation, did not scold him and explained to her son that godless times had come, that there was no need to puzzle over whether God exists or not. The main thing is to live as if He existed. Conditionally, under the presumption that some Supreme Being "sees your every action, reads every thought, evaluates them, approves all the good and condemns all the bad." Such a position suggests "The ontology of knowledge means that something really exists. We can only know what is actually there. First being, then knowing. The ontology of faith is directly opposite: first faith, then being. Faith itself creates reality. Unlike knowledge, which is secondary in relation to reality, it is primary in relation to it.[1] This requires a special analysis of religion. Such an analysis confirms that faith in God is sufficient for it, that faith has no other grounds at all. Even Tertullian's famous formula "I believe, because it is absurd" is not needed here. It is enough to accept the presumption: I believe without any "for". As if the believer were God himself, carried Him in himself, contained Him in his faith, which owns the believer. Here the non-believer owns the faith, but, on the contrary, the faith owns the believer. This is faith in its purest form, faith itself or faith "as such."

Belief in God, understood as separate from the believer, presupposes doubt in his existence and needs to prove Him with the help of knowledge. Consequently, faith in such a God already leads beyond the limits of faith, is already the beginning of the denial of God. This principle is called not theism, but atheism. This beginning can only be overcome by God himself, if he existed, for God cannot believe in his existence, since he cannot relate to himself as to something outside of himself. And at the same time, He cannot but believe in His existence, because He exists. Such is the paradox of religious faith.

Analogue

Such overcoming is the faith of the believer in God, which possesses the person, which has mastered him. Such faith is like a chip that is embedded in the human brain and controls it. Only it is built not into the brain, but into its psyche, consciousness and thinking, which are usually recognized as a function of brain activity. If faith were built directly into the nervous system and into the brain, then faith in God could be suspected not only in humans, but also in animals[2].

The difference between faith and knowledge is obvious, because it involves methods and means of suggestion, suggestion, programming, and not knowledge; for example, neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) is clearly different from cognition, in which a person acts as a subject that produces knowledge while he acts as an object of NLP. By programming, something is put into it that turns it into a manageable tool. The program is applied to human activity, structuring and sealing/organizing it in a special, material way. Suggestion acts as a method of such application. Speech plays a great role in it, to which B.F. Porshnev[3].The connection of religion with language, speech, the word as a means of suggestion, and not of knowledge, emphasized S.S. Neretina, striving "if not to understand the reasons for the breakdown of the ancient worldview that led to the intellectual victory of Christianity, then to discover the features of the philosophical environment that nurtured them"[4]. In the processes

[1]Huseynov AA. The doctrine of the life of Alexander Zinoviev. *Questions of Philosophy*. 2008;7:16–17.

[2]Here we can draw an analogy with the reproduction of animals and humans, whose reproduction is controlled by a mode of production that, as demographers are well aware, acquires a social character: people began to multiply from the moment when, thanks to production, they received the status of "productive force".

[3]Porshnev BV. About the beginning of human history. M., 1974. Ch. 3.

[4]Neretina S.S. Faithful Mind. On the history of medieval philosophy. Arkhangelsk, 1995. S. 3.

of suggestion, a person does not act as a subject, as in cognition, in which a person is precisely a subject, and cognition is considered as a subject-object relationship; as for the processes of suggestion, suggestion, etc., the person acts in them as an object of programming. As recognized by S.S. Neretina, "the idea of frank knowledge, since it is frankly, is in edification. I believe that the term "knowledge" in this case is inappropriate ... "[5]. After all, a person is an executor of the divine will, he is a "servant of God", as the Scripture says about him. Note that S.P. Lebedev sees the essence of idealism in programming, which becomes the basis for the image of the founder of Aristotle's idealism. And this is no coincidence. What is important for religion is not the knowledge of the world by a person, leading to the discovery and recognition of being, but its programming, while "forgetting being". This can be demonstrated as follows. A human tool includes a CNC, an intellect that programs its behavior, which is not a product of the cognitive activity of this tool, although the latter exists in the being around it, where it must fulfill the will of a person as a subject. It is in this form that "consciousness" is present in the medium, which is fundamentally different from "cognitive". Here it is necessary to look for the essence of the position (Socrates - M.P.) that only those who know do good. He who does not know does not do good. The means can only carry out the will of the knower, and in this sense it "participates" in doing it, but not of its own accord.

Therefore, Thomas Aquinas chose the philosophical system of Aristotle from all ancient systems, which he declared on behalf of religion to be a true system, proposing a doctrine of two truths: cognitive and religious-"technological". This indicates that faith as a phenomenon of the psyche, consciousness and thinking is connected with the brain activity of a person, but does not stem from it, although it is usually believed that the head, the head activity itself, is sufficient for thinking. The psyche, consciousness and thinking stem from the development of being, the world as a whole, they are determined by this development. It is no coincidence that they say that they are the products of the development of reflection as a universal property of matter, the highest forms of this attribute. All of them are secondary to matter, being, generated by the development of being itself. Primary, therefore, is being taken in its development. Arising as a result of the development of being, moving matter, different forms of reflection, in particular the psyche, consciousness, thinking *are generated* development processes, are determined, conditioned by them. And, in turn, they are internal determinants, factors of such development processes that ensure the existence and prolongation of the evolving being. Without such a context, reflection in all its forms, including the psyche, consciousness, thinking, cannot be adequately understood.

In view of the important role of the psyche, consciousness, thinking as internal factors in the evolution of being as a whole, there is no reason to declare the passivity of reflection in general and its higher forms. Secondary does not mean passivity of reflection, psyche, thinking. The development of being generates in these forms of reflection a kind of instrument for its further existence. It is well known, for example, that the psyche has played and is playing a very important role in the mechanism of evolution itself generated by natural evolution, that it ensures the survival of organisms and their adaptation to the natural environment. Without various forms of reflection, the development of being would be impossible. Without them, the emergence of culture, understood as the totality of all methods and results of human interaction with the reality surrounding him, would be impossible.

As for consciousness, thinking, their emergence was due to the ascent of matter to the level of the social form of movement to which they "belong". They are generated at this stage of the development of being and act as internal determinants of the further evolution of social matter. The psyche, being "transplanted" into a social form of the movement of being, develops, transforms into consciousness and thinking, more complex forms of reflection and "tools" for the further development of being that has acquired human forms of its existence compared to the previous ones. The fundamental thesis, which will form the basis of further presentation, is the idea that, firstly, human history proper is a progressively accelerating process of development and cannot be understood outside of this.[6], secondly, the dynamics of human history fits into the broader context of the development of moving matter or material movement[7], thirdly, and itself represents a broader context of development in all its inconsistency.

Religious faith also appears at this level, it is inherent in the social form of the movement of being, it presupposes the formation of the productive organs of social man, i.e. technology, which testifies to the active attitude of man to nature in the direct process of production of his life and its social conditions associated with the division of labor, the emergence of social inequality, power, etc.[8] The difference between "natural technology" and human "production" is expressed in the difference in the history of animals and people. Animals are passive objects of their history, taking part in it, i.e. without their knowledge or desire. People, however, the farther they move away from animals, the more they make their history themselves, consciously, and the influence of uncontrollable forces and unforeseen circumstances on their history decreases. This is expressed in an increase in the degree of compliance of the results obtained by them with pre-set goals. Therefore, it was said earlier that philosophy singles out two sides in history, the history of nature and the history of people, which are inextricably linked; as long as people exist, they mutually determine each other, therefore even "pure" natural science receives its goal, as well as its material, only thanks to trade and industry, therefore K. Marx noted that "production serves ... as the deep basis of everything of the sensible world as it now exists", although what has been said, of course, does not apply to the primary people who arose by generatio aequivoca (spontaneous generation - M.P.) people", when the "priority of spring nature" was clearly distinguished. Being inside nature, we humans must learn to regulate its processes, for which simple knowledge is not enough. A revolution is needed in practice, in our mode of production, in order to free history from the blind play of uncontrolled forces, which implies the transformation of a philosophical worldview into a "practical theory" for the transformation of social matter, in which resistance to such a transformation arises, i.e. there is a fact of struggle between

[5]Neretina S.S. Faithful Mind. S. 147.

[6]For example: Pajitnoy A.M. On the dialectics of the acceleration of progressive development (On the formulation of the question) / / Proceedings of the Irkutsk Polytechnic. Ying-ta. Issue. 29. A series of societies. Sciences. Philosophy. 1966.

[7]"Although in the Tertiary and Quaternary geological periods the development of the biosphere reaches its maximum acceleration, we can still start human social history as if from scratch: the acceleration continues, but it is possible only due to the fact that this new, higher form of the movement of matter appears in the world, in which the former, biological transformation, can already be equated with immobility. Indeed, Homo sapiens does not physically change during history" (Porshnev B.F. On the Beginning of Human History. Problems of Paleopsychology). M., 1974. S. 27–28.

[8]"Darwin was interested in the history of natural technology, i.e. the formation of plant and animal organs that play the role of tools of production in the life of plants and animals, "but no less attention" deserves the history of the formation of the productive organs of social man "(Marx K. Capital. Critique of political economy. T.1. M., 1963. P. 383. Note No. 89).

the "old", religious and "new", philosophical worldview in the course of the cultural and historical development of mankind.However, this correspondence cannot be absolute. It is complemented, as by its opposite, by inconsistency, by the persistence of the predominance of unforeseen consequences and uncontrollable forces set in motion by production itself, "technology".

According to F. Engels, Darwin did not suspect what a bitter satire he wrote about people when he proved that the "struggle for existence", presented as the greatest historical achievement of people, is "the normal state of the animal world." "Darwinian struggle" for a separate existence turns out to be "with tenfold fury"[9]transferred from nature to society, and the social character of the means of production and products turns against the producers themselves, makes its way as a blindly operating law of nature, violently and destructively[10], remains outside the scope of knowledge[11]which opens up the possibility of changing the situation for the better for a person.

For the first time in philosophy, Socrates began to study this circumstance. In the doctrine of virtue, he argued that virtue cannot be built on anything other than knowledge and knowledge. Wealth, power, etc. cannot by their own nature be good as such, and if they are led by ignorance, they contribute to the greatest evil; if they are controlled by knowledge, science, then they become, according to J. Reale and D. Antiseri, the greatest blessings[12]. This idea will become the starting point for Marxism. It is built into the human psyche like a control chip by people involved in this "technology", representing it, and not at all knowledge-knowledge in the minds of people. So, "when entering into communication, people in all somewhat complex social formations" do not know "what social relations are formed in this case, according to what laws they develop, etc. For example, a peasant, selling bread, enters into "communication" with world producers of bread on the world market, but he is not aware of this, he is not aware of what social relations are formed from exchange.[13]. True, A.A. Bogdanov believed that social life in all its manifestations is consciously mental, that sociality is inseparable from consciousness, that "social being and social consciousness, in the exact sense of these words, are identical." According to V.I. Lenin, they are not at all identical: social being is primary, and social consciousness is secondary and somehow reflects it. From the fact that people live and manage, give birth to children and produce products, exchange them, of course, not without the participation of consciousness, "an objectively necessary chain of events is formed, a chain of development, independent of social consciousness, never completely covered by it; even "70 Marx. At the most, the laws of these changes are revealed, the main and basically objective logic of these changes and their historical development is shown, - objective not in the sense that a society of conscious beings, people, could exist and develop independently of the existence of conscious beings, but "in the sense that social being is independent of the social consciousness of people." And "the highest task of mankind" is "to adapt to it", to objective logic, "its own social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes"[14].

This means that the rational content of A.A. Bogdanov is the transition to such knowledge of the objective logic of development.

As you can see, here attention is drawn to the cognitive attitude of a person to the world in the narrow sense of the word, as thinking and activity of a special kind and its difference from consciousness in other forms of human existence. "Since individual capitalists are engaged in production and exchange for the sake of immediate profit, they can take into account in the first place only the most immediate, most immediate results. When an individual manufacturer or merchant sells a commodity that he has manufactured or purchased at an ordinary profit, he is completely satisfied, and he is not at all interested in what will happen next with this commodity and the person who bought it, "with the natural consequences of these very actions,"[15]. Here one can see the fundamental difference between cognitive consciousness and consciousness arising from the "struggle for existence."

To finally complete this story, it must be added that, for example, in the Soviet period, the most important projects began with knowledge, based on knowledge, involving outstanding scientists in it, taking into account the results of cognitive activity in the proposed Plans of the CPSU and the State, while today, on the contrary, First of all, it takes into account the will of the owners involved in the above-described "technology", which embeds its "chip" in the mind of the person who controls it. The activity based on cognition was replaced by the power of the "employer", who does not act on the basis of cognition, but on the basis of "forgetfulness of being", drowning in technology based on transferring the "struggle for existence" from nature to society "with tenfold force" stemming from the social nature of the technology, which turns against the producers themselves.

The opposite of "epistemological" and "technological" consciousness is evident. Today, humanity, represented by the most "advanced" countries, is looking for ways to go beyond the boundaries of "technological" and finds it in the concepts of "knowledge-based society", "information society", "post-industrial society", etc., relies on scientific knowledge and a breakthrough based on it: "Today, we put science back at the top of our agenda to restore America's leadership in science and technology"[16], realizing that modern "problems" cannot be solved "manually"," that the main driving force of all social, economic, technological and social changes since the mid-40s of the twentieth century. and to this day becomes a science[17]. Cognition leads to the discovery and recognition of being, on the contrary, technology leads to the "forgetting of being", which M. Heidegger drew attention to when analyzing the teachings of Plato and Aristotle[18], but did not explain, however, "why" it is in "technology" that the "oblivion of being" originates.

"Forgetfulness of being" means a transition to the positions of idealism. We can agree with V.I. Lenin that the opposite of materialism and idealism is revealed precisely in "epistemology", where the definition of matter as a philosophical category is given - to oppose "materialism" to "idealism" and counterfeits of materialism, in which idealism is hidden "for supposedly materialistic terminology"[19]. It is on this basis that religious faith arises.[20]. Thus, emerging power relations, domination, implying submission, find expression already in mythological ideas about the gods, and reaching the use of the term Lord, for example, to the Christian God. They are exalted, deified

[9]Engels F. Dialectics of nature. Introduction // Marx K., Engels F. Works. Second ed. T. 20. M., 1961. S. 359.

[10]Engels F. Dialectics of nature. Introduction. S. 290.

[11]Engels F. Dialectics of nature. Introduction. S. 291.

[12]Reale J. Antiseri D. Western philosophy from its origins to the present day. I. Antiquity. M., 1994. S. 66.

[13]Lenin VI. Materialism and empirio-criticism // Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 18. M., 1973. S. 342–343.

[14]Lenin VI. Materialism and empirio-criticism // Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 18. M., 1973. S. 345.

[15]Engels F. Dialectics of nature. Introduction // Marx K., Engels F. Works. Second ed. T. 20. M., 1961. S. 498-499.

[16]Access code: http://www.polit.ru/news/2008/obama_science.popup.html.

[17]Rakitov AI. Science, education and super-industrial society: a realistic project for Russia // Questions of Philosophy. 2009. No. 12. P. 61.

[18]Heidegger M. What is called thinking. M., 2007. S. 145.

[19]Lenin VI. Materialism and empirio-criticism // Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 18. M., 1973. S. 350.

[20]Kautsky K. Origin of Christianity. Per. with him. N. Ryazanova. M.: Politizdat, 1990. 463 p.

and, like a chip, they are embedded in the psyche, consciousness and thinking of people, perform the functions of social technology, controlling their thinking and behavior.

An analysis of Plutarch's polemic against Epicurus's theology shows, for example, that inMoloch was the ruler of antiquity. And the Delphic Apollo was a real force in the life of the ancient Greeks. Here even the criticism of I. Kant, who opposed thalers in his mind to thalers in his pocket, cannot do anything. After all, if someone imagines that he possesses a hundred thalers, and if he believes in this, then for him these hundred imaginary thalers have the same meaning as a hundred real thalers. For example, he will make debts based on his fantasy. Man will act as all mankind has acted, incurring debts at the expense of his gods, who exist only in his imagination. And real thalers have the same existence as imaginary gods. Does a real thaler exist anywhere but a representation, indeed, a general or, rather, a public representation of people? True, believers believe in their god, not recognizing an alien god, they doubt the effectiveness of the latter. Therefore, if someone brought to the ancient Greeks any Vendian god, he would find evidence of the non-existence of this god. After all, for the Greeks, the Vendian god did not exist, they did not believe in him.

As you can see, the effectiveness of ideas in the life of a person and society, both personal and social, matters: the idea (= ideal) belongs not only to the human head of the subject, but enters (s) into objective existence. The one who interprets the ideal exclusively as a product of the human head and activity, not entering (s) into objective existence, but closed, even in the bonds of culture, erects an impenetrable wall between the world of culture and the rest of being, soulless, meaningless and terrible. The world of culture is deprived here of its rootedness in the infinity of inexhaustible being, surpassing any human possibilities and assumptions. And at the same time, we have the right to pose a simple but fundamental question: does the world as a whole exist in culture, or does culture, in which we also find faith in God, does culture as a whole exist in the world as a whole? An ideal, human idea, faith, participate in the evolution of being from the moment of its origin, just as a person participates in it after his appearance in the course of the development of being. Philosophy does not deny such effectiveness. On the contrary, it requires taking into account the existential, including the socio-historical context of existence, and the effectiveness of ideas in them. This requirement extends to "proofs for the existence of God." For a person who imagines the existence of the world as random, unstable, etc. Thus, his proof reads: "Since the accidental has a true being, then God exists." Those. God is "a guarantee for the contingent world." This also confirms the opposite. Thus, the ontological proof boils down to the following: "What I really (really) conceive to myself is for me a real idea", since it acts on me. It is in this sense that all the gods, both pagan and Christian, had a real existence. After all, religion is "a living faith in a living God."

True, the Latin author of the early 4th century, Arnobius, who was very educated for his time, convincingly shows in his Seven Books Against the Pagans that the mythological gods are in fact not gods, that only Christians honor the true, i.e. supernatural God, the Creator of man with his consciousness and with all the objective reality of the world around him. Arnobius conducts a scrupulous cognitive analysis of the ideas about the gods in myths in order to separate myths from the Christian religion.

A pagan in the past, Arnobius was fascinated by the One God of Christians, His omnipotence and perfection, breaking with the limited possibilities of the pagan gods dissolved in the objectively real universe. Therefore, he accepted Christianity and pointed out the technological incommensurability of pagan gods and the God of Christians. He pointed to different ways and means of achieving power and control over the surrounding universe in myth and religion: absolute, supernatural-fantastic in Christianity and relative, earthly limited in paganism. The pagan gods, Arnobius is convinced, "are something completely different and must be separated from the concept of this name and power; this is the essence of the matter, the point around which everything revolves", "the main question" separating true religion from paganism[21]. The mythological "gods" and the God of the Christian religion Arnobius refers to different categories.

The first do not have a supernatural character and omnipotence abilities. They are products of human fantasy, inventions of people themselves. The miracles associated with them in fact demonstrate, emphasizes the apologist of Christianity, "a completely natural character", their mode of activity, technology simply "has the appearance of a miraculous or, better to say, is recognized as such"[22]. They are deprived of technological omnipotence, rooted in the surrounding nature, limited by nature, not transcendent to it. They do not oppose the world of nature, people and heroes, but are dissolved in objective reality, not transcendent to it, being its fantastic continuation. This is expressed in the recognition of the semi-divineness of human heroes, from whom they differ in degree, and not in a fundamental way; pagan gods are not capable of performing supernatural and therefore inexplicable miracles. As a rule, they are narrowly specialized in a particular type of activity. This corresponds to the division of labor among people:"You included among the gods Liber (Dionysus, Bacchus) for the discovery (technology - M.P.) of wine, Ceres - bread, Aesculapius - herbs, Minerva - (for the planting technology) of the olive tree, Triptolemus - (for the invention) of the plow [the son of the Eleusinian king Keleus Triptolem was considered the inventor of the plow and the distributor of agriculture and related culture, technology - M.P.], finally. Hercules - because he overcame and tamed wild animals, thieves and many-headed snakes "[23]. None of these "gods" has signs of the One God of Christians as the supernatural Subject of all possible ways of activity, the otherworldly Creator of everything objectively existing.

Arnobius shows us how technology in religion is detached from man and presented as the supernatural activity of God, the Creator of everything. In it, the natural world is not recognized as higher. Technology, human labor, but in a transformed form of the supernatural activity of God, is elevated to the rank of sacred, true being. The earthly basis for this deification is that, as the predecessor of Adam Smith's labor theory of value, J. Locke, already noted, "ninety-nine hundredths of all things useful to a person owe their origin to his labor, and not to nature"[24].

Man and the entire universe are recognized as existing only in the context of supernatural technology, a transformed form of deified labor. Religion claims to "legitimize" it, justify it by elevating it from the natural to the supernatural. Only it, according to believers, gives legitimacy to labor, as if without this sanctification, without God, it did not exist and does not exist. Arnobius therefore demands from the pagans that they themselves prove that, besides the supernatural God of the Christians, "there are other gods by nature, power and name, not represented in the images that we see, but in that being, regarding which it should be recognized that he must possess the power of such a great name"[25].

However, whether God in all his supernatural existence actually exists, Arnobius does not prove this either. Here he changes the

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[21]Arnobius. against the pagans. SPb., 2008. S. 360–361.
[22]Arnobius. against the pagans. pp. 62–363.
[23]Arnobius. against the pagans. S. 146.
[24]Lifshitz M. Dialogue with Evald Ilyenkov: The Problem of the Ideal. M., 2003. S. 134.
[25]Arnobius. against the pagans. pp. 222–223.

cognitive attitude with which he approached the mythological ideas of the "pagans". He confines himself to a simple declaration showing that he himself is already programmed by the religion of the Christians. Consequently, to his arguments in defense of the Christian religion "against the pagans" all those claims, arguments that he himself - quite reasonably - makes to ancient Greek mythology, to its gods, are applicable when he doubts their real existence beyond the limits of ideas and requires proof from the pagans. their existence, i.e. requires an epistemological attitude towards them on the part of the "pagans". We also have the right to doubt the existence of a supernatural Creator, otherworldly objective reality, demand reasonable evidence of His existence from Arnobius and other champions of the new religious worldview. And then it turns out that "what any particular country is for foreign gods, the country of reason (knowledge - M.P.) is for god in general - an area where his existence ceases"[26]. This is how the opposite of religious dogma to reason with its philosophical and epistemological faith is revealed: "philosophical and epistemological faith is fundamentally different (highlighted by me - M.P.) from the religious authoritarian dogmatic faith ... drawn from the Holy Scriptures"[27].

Conclusion

The article substantiates the fundamental difference between the "ontology of knowledge" and the "ontology of faith". For the ontology of knowledge, it is true to recognize the primacy of being and the secondary nature of knowledge about it. For the ontology of faith, this relationship turns out to be the opposite: the primacy of the idea of God, faith in God and the secondary nature of the human activity emanating from this, transforming the world. Faith itself creates the surrounding reality through human activity. Religion does not presuppose any other grounds and justifications of faith, as proved in the article. It does not even require justification in the form of Tertullian's famous statement: "I believe, because it is absurd." I believe in God without any reason, based on my faith as a subject of activity.

Modern Religion does not presuppose any other grounds and justifications of faith, as proved in the article. It does not even require justification in the form of Tertullian's famous statement: "I believe, because it is absurd." I believe in God without any reason, based on my faith as a subject of activity. Faith does not depend on whether God exists "in fact", "in reality". The believer contains God in his faith as a subject of activity, as a practical subject. He acts as if God really existed. Hence the effectiveness of the religious faith of the person himself-as-the subject of action. It turns out that not a believer owns his faith, but faith itself owns a person. Faith, like a chip, is embedded in a person's worldview and controls, manipulates it.

The article discusses the paradoxes arising in the context of the religious ontology of faith, which can be overcome from the standpoint of philosophical and ideological cognition, proceeding from the principle of primacy of being.

Acknowledgments

Conflicts of interest

Funding

[26]Marx K, Engels F. From early works. M., 1956. S. 98.
[27]Sokolov VV. Subject-object paradigm as the core of identifying the unity of the historical-philosophical process // Philosophy and Society. No. 3. 2009. P. 6.